The Unconscious Formation of Motor and Abstract Intentions by Soon, Chun Siong
The Unconscious Formation of 
Motor and Abstract Intentions
 D I S S E R T A T I O N 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
Doctor rerum naturalium 
(Dr. rer. nat.) 
vorgelegt 
der Fakultät Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften 
der Technischen Universität Dresden 
von 
B.A.(Hon.) Philo/Psych., B.Sc. Phys. Soon Chun Siong
geboren am 26 Jul 1975 in Singapur 
Gutachter: 
Prof. Dr. John-Dylan Haynes (Berlin) 
Prof. Dr. Thomas Goschke (Dresden) 
Tag der Verteidigung: 10.04.2017 
Die Dissertation wurde in der Zeit von Februar 2006 bis Juli 2009 
im Max-Planck-Institut für Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaften angefertigt. 

 i 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to 
my wife Huang Shuyun and my son Soon Chenxuan 
for enduring forty-two long months of my absence 
while I pursued my dreams. 
 ii 
Acknowledgement 
This thesis has taken many years in the making, since the outline of the first study 
was chiselled out on the first day I set foot in the cold winter of Leipzig from the 
perpetual summer of Singapore in 2006. I must express my deepest gratitude for Prof. 
Dr. John-Dylan Haynes for making this possible despite the many obstacles along the 
way, and continuing to explore new avenues for me even after I left his lab. I will 
never forget the many summers and winters spent with my wonderful lab partners in 
Leipzig, Stefan Bode, Carsten Bogler, Christian Kalberlah, Chen Yi, Marcus Grüshow, 
Anna He, Annette Horstmann, Anita Tusche, Susann Szukalski and their partners / 
families in Germany and overseas, and lifelong personal friends, Lin, Raymond, Nora, 
Thomas, and Nicole, the wonderful people who gave me a home away from home. 
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences provided the perfect 
environment, technical, manpower and financial support to conduct our research. 
Finally, I am truly grateful to Technische Universität Dresden for accepting me as a 
PhD candidate, given the somewhat unusual circumstances. Special thanks must be 
given to Prof. Dr. Thomas Goschke for his support of my candidature, without whom 
this would not have been possible. 
 iii 
Statement 
The following experimental studies included in this dissertation have already been 
published: 
Study 1 (Chapter 2): 
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). 
Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature 
Neuroscience, 11(5), 543-545. 
doi:10.1038/nn.2112 
 
Study 2 (Chapter 3): 
Bode, S., He, A. H., Soon, C. S., Trampel, R., Turner, R., & Haynes, J. D. 
(2011). Tracking the unconscious generation of free decisions using ultra-
high field fMRI. PLoS One, 6(6), e21612. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612 
 
Study 3 (Chapter 4): 
Soon, C. S., He, A. H., Bode, S., & Haynes, J. D. (2013). Predicting free 
choices for abstract intentions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 110(15), 6217-
6222. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1212218110 
 
 
 
Contact: soonchunsiong@gmail.com 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract 1 
 
1.   General Introduction 5 
1.1.  The roots of mental causation ........................................................................... 5 
1.2.  Clocking intentions ........................................................................................... 8 
1.3.  Limitations of the EEG intention clock .......................................................... 10 
1.4.  General Paradigm ........................................................................................... 13 
1.4.1.   Time for a new intention clock ............................................................ 13 
1.4.2.   Searching for intentions in dynamic brain patterns ............................. 15 
1.5.  Overview of studies and research questions ................................................... 19 
1.5.1.   Study 1: Decoding the unconscious formation of 
motor intentions .................................................................................... 19 
1.5.2.   Study 2: Temporal stability of neural patterns involved in 
intention formation ............................................................................... 20 
1.5.3.   Study 3: Decoding the unconscious formation of 
abstract intentions ................................................................................. 20 
 
2.   Study 1: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Motor Intentions 21 
2.1.  Abstract ........................................................................................................... 22 
2.2.  Introduction ..................................................................................................... 23 
2.3.  Methods .......................................................................................................... 25 
2.3.1.   Participants ........................................................................................... 25 
2.3.2.   Behavioural paradigm .......................................................................... 25 
2.3.3.   Functional imaging and preprocessing ................................................ 28 
2.3.4.   General linear model ............................................................................ 29 
Contents 
 
 v 
2.3.5.   Multivariate pattern analyses ............................................................... 30 
2.3.6.   Post-scan behavioural control: Unconstrained clock time ................... 33 
2.3.7.   Control fMRI experiment: Delayed motor intentions .......................... 34 
2.4.  Results ............................................................................................................. 35 
2.4.1.   Behavioural results ............................................................................... 35 
2.4.2.   Functional imaging results ................................................................... 37 
2.4.3.   Results of post-scan behavioural control: Unconstrained clock time .. 46 
2.4.4.   Results of control fMRI experiment: Delayed motor intention ........... 48 
2.5.  Discussion ....................................................................................................... 50 
2.6.  Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... 55 
 
3.   Study 2: Temporal Stability of Neural Patterns Involved in Intention 
Formation 56 
3.1.  Abstract ........................................................................................................... 57 
3.2.  Introduction ..................................................................................................... 58 
3.3.  Methods .......................................................................................................... 60 
3.3.1.   Participants ........................................................................................... 60 
3.3.2.   Behavioural paradigm .......................................................................... 61 
3.3.3.   Functional imaging and preprocessing ................................................ 64 
3.3.4.   General linear model ............................................................................ 66 
3.3.5.   Multivariate pattern analyses ............................................................... 67 
3.4.  Results ............................................................................................................. 71 
3.4.1.   Behavioural results ............................................................................... 71 
3.4.2.   Functional imaging results ................................................................... 74 
3.5.  Discussion ....................................................................................................... 81 
3.6.  Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... 88 
 
Contents 
 
 vi 
4.   Study 3: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Abstract Intentions 89 
4.1.  Abstract ........................................................................................................... 90 
4.2.  Introduction ..................................................................................................... 91 
4.3.  Methods .......................................................................................................... 93 
4.3.1.   Participants ........................................................................................... 93 
4.3.2.   Behavioural paradigm .......................................................................... 93 
4.3.3.   Functional imaging and preprocessing ................................................ 97 
4.3.4.   General linear model ............................................................................ 98 
4.3.5.   Multivariate pattern analyses ............................................................... 98 
4.3.6.   Independent components analyses ..................................................... 101 
4.4.  Results ........................................................................................................... 102 
4.4.1.   Behavioural results ............................................................................. 102 
4.4.2.   Functional imaging results ................................................................. 103 
4.4.3.   DMN and intention formation ........................................................... 110 
4.5.  Discussion ..................................................................................................... 112 
4.6.  Acknowledgements ....................................................................................... 118 
 
5.    General Discussion 119 
5.1.  Summary of findings .................................................................................... 120 
5.1.1.   Decoding decision outcome ............................................................... 121 
5.1.2.   Decoding decision time ...................................................................... 123 
5.2.  Predicting the upcoming decision, not the previous one .............................. 125 
5.3.  Networks of intention ................................................................................... 128 
5.3.1.   Frontopolar cortex .............................................................................. 129 
5.3.2.   Precuneus / Posterior cingulate .......................................................... 133 
5.3.3.   Pre-SMA / SMA ................................................................................ 135 
Contents 
 
 vii 
5.4.  Functional role of consciousness in volitional acts ...................................... 138 
5.5.  Conclusion and outlook ................................................................................ 143 
 
References 145 
Contact: soonchunsiong@gmail.com 
List of Figures 
 
Fig. 1-1. Multivoxel decoding from local spatial patterns using 
a moving “searchlight” ................................................................................. 17 
 
Fig. 2-1. Measuring the onset time of free conscious motor intentions ....................... 28 
Fig. 2-2. Distribution of judged conscious decision time ............................................ 36 
Fig. 2-3. Decoding the outcome of motor decisions before and after they 
reach conscious awareness ............................................................................ 38 
Fig. 2-4. BOLD and information timecourses in all regions containing 
intention-related information ........................................................................ 40 
Fig. 2-5. Information profiles across multiple brain regions ....................................... 43 
Fig. 2-6. Example of voxel selectivity for a representative searchlight ....................... 44 
Fig. 2-7. Decoding the outcome of a decision from motion parameters ...................... 45 
Fig. 2-8. Post-scan behavioural control experiment on decision timing ...................... 47 
Fig. 2-9. Decoding the outcome of delayed motor intentions ...................................... 49 
 
Fig. 3-1. Measuring the onset time of free conscious motor intentions ....................... 63 
Fig. 3-2. Illustration of EPI image, slice positioning and decoding approach ............. 65 
Fig. 3-3. Decoding of upcoming motor decisions from frontopolar cortex ................. 75 
Fig. 3-4. Individual searchlight clusters ....................................................................... 76 
Fig. 3-5. Univariate BOLD signal changes .................................................................. 77 
Fig. 3-6. Temporal pattern stability ............................................................................. 79 
Fig. 3-7. Correlation analysis for spatial activation patterns ....................................... 80 
List of Figures 
 
 
 ix 
Fig. 4-1. Measuring the onset time of free conscious abstract intentions .................... 94 
Fig. 4-2. Decoding the outcome of abstract decisions before and after 
they reach conscious awareness .................................................................. 103 
Fig. 4-3. Decoding accuracies and BOLD activation from regions that 
encoded either the content or timing of abstract decisions ......................... 105 
Fig. 4-4. Decoding the response hand for the arithmetic task ................................... 107 
Fig. 4-5. Classification results for timing of upcoming decisions ............................. 109 
Fig. 4-6. Brain images showing the default mode network ....................................... 110 
Fig. 4-7. Changes in overall default mode network activity for 
spontaneous motor and abstract intentions ................................................. 111 
 
Fig. 5-1. Predictive brain signals do not encode decision in previous trial ............... 127 
 
 
 
 
 x 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2-1. Brain areas encoding intention prior to conscious decision ....................... 39 
 
Table 3-1. Behavioural results ..................................................................................... 72 
Table 3-2. Individual post-experimental interview results .......................................... 73 
 
 
 xi 
Abbreviations 
BOLD  Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent 
DMN  Default Mode Network 
EEG  Electroencephalography 
EMG  Electromyography 
EPI  Echo-Planar Imaging 
FDR  False-Discovery Rate 
FIR  Finite Impulse Response 
fMRI  functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
FOV  Field Of View 
FPC  Frontopolar Cortex 
FWHM Full Width at Half Maximum 
LRP  Lateralized Readiness Potential 
MEG  Magnetoencephalography  
MVPA  Multi-Voxel Pattern Analyses 
PCC  Posterior Cingulate Cortex 
pre-SMA pre-Supplementary Motor Area 
RF  Readiness Field (a.k.a. Bereitschaftsmagnetfeld) 
RP  Readiness Potential (a.k.a. Bereitschaftspotential) 
SD  Standard Deviation 
SE  Standard Error 
SMA  Supplementary Motor Area 
SVM  Support Vector Machine 
TE  Time of Echo 
TR  Time of Repetition 
“Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we are 
sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. 
Do you find anything in it like this creative power, by which it 
raises from nothing a new idea, and with a kind of Fiat, imitates 
the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, who 
called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature? So far 
from being conscious of this energy in the will, it requires as 
certain experience as that of which we are possessed, to convince us 
that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of 
volition.” 
Hume, 1748 
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §VII 
Abstract 
 
The capacity to act voluntarily is an integral part of the subjective human 
experience: my mind makes a conscious decision to act, and this decision is executed 
by my physical body. Intuitively, I feel that my body is not acting under the command 
of an external force or agent, but under my conscious volitional control. This 
assumption, so fundamental to the human psyche, has been challenged in the last few 
decades by neuroscientific findings showing that even before one consciously decides 
to make a simple button press, a negative electrical potential that signifies voluntary 
movement preparation can already be detected over the cortical midline (Haggard and 
Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). This temporal precedence implies that unconscious 
neural activity – rather than conscious intentions – may play a substantial role in 
voluntary actions. The corollary is that our subjective sense of volition may be 
illusory: the conscious mind may simply become aware of unconsciously formed 
decisions. 
However, to date these findings remain controversial due to various 
conceptual and technical issues (Baker et al., 2012; Banks & Pockett, 2007; 
Breitmeyer, 1985; Eccles, 1985; Gomes, 1998; McCallum, 1998; Pockett, 2002; Mele, 
2009; Schlegel et al., 2013; Trevena and Miller, 2002). Crucially, the onset of the 
electrical potential precedes the conscious decision by only a few hundred 
milliseconds, ~300 ms (Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983; Trevena and 
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Miller, 2002)1, and could be due to inaccuracies in judging or reporting the exact time 
of conscious decision with such high precision (Lau et al., 2006, 2007). Thus, it is 
difficult to conclusively establish the temporal order of the conscious decision and 
measurable neural changes at such short delays. 
This thesis aims to provide more conclusive evidence regarding the timing of 
neural changes relative to conscious decisions, and to further elucidate the specific 
functional roles of early predictive neural activity in shaping the timing and content of 
upcoming decisions. Crucially, in addition to studying regions restricted to motor 
preparation, we sought to uncover neural networks across the brain involved in the 
genesis of high-level intentions. Three separate functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) studies were conducted to study the neural dynamics of free decision 
formation. The higher spatial resolution of fMRI facilitated the use of sensitive novel 
pattern classification techniques that maximized information extraction from fine-
grained local activation patterns in blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signals. In 
each experiment, as participants spontaneously decided between two possible courses 
of action, we performed a whole-brain search for activity patterns that could predict 
their eventual choices, using highly sensitive multivariate pattern recognition 
techniques. If the specific outcomes of their decisions were encoded in neural activity 
even before they reached awareness, it would suggest that, at least in some decision 
contexts, our conscious choices may be related to preceding unconscious neural 
activity. 
 
 
                                                
1 But recent depth electrode recordings have shown that the firing rates of single 
neurons may start changing up to 9000 ms before the conscious decision (Fried et al., 
2011). 
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In Study 1, we first searched across the brain for spatiotemporal patterns that 
could predict the specific outcome and timing of a free motor decision to make a left 
or right button press (Soon et al., 2008). In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 using ultra-
high field fMRI for improved temporal and spatial resolution to more accurately 
characterize the evolution of decision-predictive information in prefrontal cortex 
(Bode et al., 2011). In Study 3, to unequivocally dissociate high-level intentions from 
motor preparation and execution, we investigated the neural precursors of abstract 
intentions as participants spontaneously decided to perform either of two mental 
arithmetic tasks: addition or subtraction (Soon et al., 2013). 
Across the three studies, we consistently found that upcoming decisions could 
be predicted with ~60% accuracy from fine-grained spatial activation patterns 
occurring a few seconds before the decisions reached awareness, with very similar 
profiles for both motor and abstract intentions. The content and timing of the 
decisions appeared to be encoded in two functionally dissociable sets of regions: 
frontopolar and posterior cingulate/ precuneus cortex encoded the content but not the 
timing of the decisions, while the pre-supplementary motor area encoded the timing 
but not the content of the decisions. The choice-predictive regions in both motor and 
abstract decision tasks overlapped partially with the default mode network (DMN). 
Interestingly, the predictive information in the choice-predictive regions also peaked 
at around the same time as the activity in the DMN. This spatial and temporal 
coincidence hinted at a potential involvement of the DMN in unconscious choice 
preparation. High-resolution imaging in Study 2 further revealed that as the time-point 
of conscious decision approached, activity patterns in frontopolar cortex became 
increasingly stable with respect to the final choice. 
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By providing a more detailed characterization of the information dynamics of 
neural changes underlying the formation of free decisions, both motoric and abstract, 
our findings have hopefully shed more light on the question: do some voluntary 
actions in fact find their causal roots in unconscious – or preconscious – neural 
activity, rather than conscious decisions. 
General Introduction 
1.1 Neural precursors of voluntary decisions 
A thought arises in my conscious mind, an intention to act. This mental 
decision is translated into an effect in the physical world via the actions of my 
musculoskeletal system. Almost every waking moment of our life, our intentions get 
acted out in this manner, sometimes according to what we envision, occasionally 
falling short. Subjectively, I feel that my body is not acting under the command of 
external forces or agents, but under my conscious volitional control. Under normal 
circumstance, while there may be external constraints over the possible courses of 
action available to me, ultimately my conscious mind appears to have sole 
dictatorship over my decisions: what I choose to do, and when to do it. This ‘ability’ 
to cause changes in the physical world according to my volition underlies my intuitive 
sense of freedom. 
However, as Hume’s (1748) astute analyses revealed, causal relations are 
never directly observed, and are nothing more than our assumptions based on the 
constant conjunction of two (or more) types of events. Similarly, perhaps my sense of 
conscious control over my actions is nothing more than a statistical inference based on 
observed regularities between my intentions to act and the intended bodily actions 
(Wegner, 2003). What I cannot observe, like neural activity in my brain, would 
naturally be left out of this inference of ‘causation’. But is this merely an esoteric 
problem for epistemological skeptics, or does it point to a deeper truth underlying the 
relationship between mind and matter? 
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Indeed, there are many exceptions to the regularity of intentions and intended 
actions, for which our conscious intentions are not deemed to be necessary as causal 
explanations for our body’s actions. There is general consensus that under a variety of 
conditions, the body’s actions are not considered truly voluntary: autonomic reflexes; 
somnambulism (sleepwalking); acting under the influence of psychoactive substances 
like alcohol or lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); during psychotic episodes or other 
mental disorders; etc. In these cases, the mind is either unconscious or in an altered 
state of consciousness, and the body’s actions are not the results of conscious 
decisions. Thus, the body’s actions are not considered truly free. This illustrates how 
important consciousness is to our intuitive concepts of free will: only actions that can 
be traced back to decisions made in a (normal waking) state of consciousness are 
candidates of freedom. In general, for other actions that are not the consequence of 
conscious volition, we seem to be quite willing to accept causal explanations that are 
purely physical, e.g., it is accepted as fact that the patellar reflex is due to neural 
signal transduction in the reflex arc mediated by the spinal cord. In other words, 
purely physical factors can compete with the mind over the control of our actions, 
thereby rendering them, at least to some extent, involuntary. It is curious that physical 
explanations for volitional actions, on the other hand, are often met with considerably 
more resistance. 
Two lines of neuroscientific findings, however, provide evidence that our 
simple conscious intentions may themselves have physical causes, or at least neural 
precursors, that are themselves not directly associated with consciousness. One line of 
evidence comes from electrical stimulation of the brain. Stimulating frontal regions, 
including the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and supplementary motor area 
(SMA), can elicit a conscious urge to perform a movement, sometimes coupled with 
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actual movement (Fried et al., 1991). More recently, similar effects have been found 
in parietal cortex stimulation (Desmurget et al., 2009). Thus, it appears that one’s 
volition can be directly shaped by stimulating specific regions of the brain. In other 
words, the ‘causal’ relationship from the mental to the physical can be reversed. One 
might argue that this is the exception rather than the rule: direct electrical stimulation 
of the brain is extraordinary, and its effects may not be representative of how normal 
intentions arise. The possibility of causing ‘urges’ artificially does not necessarily 
mean that every conscious intention is the result of physical causes. 
However, another line of evidence from electroencephalography (EEG) 
studies suggests that even self-initiated intentions have unconscious neural precursors. 
The Bereitschaftspotential (pre-motor or readiness potential, RP), an electrical 
signature of voluntary movement initiation over the cortical midline (Gilden et al., 
1966; Groll-Knapp et al., 1977; Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Libet et al., 1982), can 
be detected a few hundred milliseconds before motor execution, as measured by 
electromyography (EMG) detecting electrical activity in skeletal muscles. Crucially, 
the onset of the RP can be detected even before one has consciously decided to act 
(Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). In other words, a voluntary motor 
action may be initiated by unconscious neural activity that precedes even the 
associated conscious intention. In the next section, we consider in greater detail what 
these studies reveal about the initiation of simple voluntary motor actions, and the 
respective roles of unconscious neural activity and conscious decisions. 
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1.2 Clocking intentions 
To establish whether unconscious factors play a causal role in conscious 
decisions, one needs to show that information not readily available to conscious 
awareness can nevertheless shape our choices. For example, information contained in 
subliminal stimuli (or primes) can affect our perceptual decisions despite the lack of 
conscious representation (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 
1995; Hsieh, Colas & Kanwisher, 2011; Lau & Passingham, 2007; Lin & Murray, 
2013; Marcel, 1983a, 1983b; Murawski et al., 2012; Vorberg et al., 2003). However, 
in these studies participants are actively responding to external stimuli (but see 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004), and may thus be more sensitive to the effects of 
subthreshold stimulation, which experimenters can manipulate. Also, such decisions 
are not truly representative of human volition since participants are simply indicating 
what they perceive rather than exercising their free choice. The situation is more 
complex when trying to study how self-initiated intentions are affected by 
unconscious neural activity that experimenters have no direct control over. Even if it 
can be shown that neural activity patterns contain information about specific choices 
that we make (e.g., Haynes et al., 2007), it remains unclear whether the activity is the 
cause or effect of one’s conscious intentions. Also, such intention-related neural 
activity could be directly associated with conscious decision processes, or may reflect 
unconscious intention preparation. 
Benjamin Libet’s invention of an ‘intention clock’ effectively addressed these 
issues, pioneering the main neuroscientific approach for studying the initiation of 
voluntary actions (Libet et al., 1983) – he simply asked participants to report when 
they first became conscious of their decision to act. In his seminal study, this clock 
consisted of a spot of light revolving in a circle at 2.56 s cycles on the screen of a 
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cathode ray oscilloscope. For each trial, participants made a spontaneous flexion of 
the fingers and/or wrist of his right hand (the act of volition) any time after one full 
clock cycle had passed. They then reported the clock position of the light when they 
first subjectively experienced ‘wanting’ or intending to act (W). Thus, Libet was able 
to determine with high temporal precision when the decision first entered into 
conscious awareness. Assuming that an effect does not precede its cause, the neural 
activity before the time-point W could not have been caused by the conscious decision. 
And yet, neural changes in terms of an early RP over the cortical midline could 
already be detected a few hundred milliseconds preceding W. As the intention to act 
did not yet exist in conscious awareness, any intention-related neural information in 
this time period could be considered ‘unconscious’. The authors “concluded that the 
cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act can begin unconsciously, that 
is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness that a 'decision' to act 
has already been initiated cerebrally” (Libet et al., 1983, p. 623). This finding has 
since been consistently replicated using EEG (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Lau et al., 
2004; Schlegel et al., 2013) and direct cortical recordings (Fried, et al., 2011). 
Haggard and Eimer (1999) expanded the intention clock paradigm to 
investigate not just the timing, but also the content of a spontaneous voluntary action. 
Instead of making a fixed voluntary action, participants were free to choose between 
pressing the left or right button with their respective index fingers. In addition to the 
RP, they also measured the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), the difference in 
event-related potential between the contra- and ipsi-lateral motor cortex for movement 
with a specific hand. This allowed the authors to dissociate the neural activity related 
to a specific motor decision from general state changes such as arousal or expectancy, 
which might increase before one decides to act (McCallum, 1988). This distinction 
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was crucial in revealing neural changes that reflected the timing of the reported 
decision awareness time W. The onset of the LRP for early W trials was 193 ms 
before that of late W trials, i.e., the time of decision awareness was related to when 
motor preparations for the specific chosen hand began. In contrast, no differences in 
RP onsets were found between early and late awareness trials. These findings led the 
authors to conclude that our awareness of initiating an action relates to the preparation 
of a specific movement, rather than a general abstract intention to perform an action of 
some kind. (Note, however, that a recent study by Schlegel et al. (2013) failed to 
replicate these findings.) 
 
1.3 Limitations of the EEG intention clock 
While these pivotal EEG studies paved the way for the neuroscientific study of 
unconscious initiation of simple voluntary motor actions, they also invited wide-
ranging criticisms (see Open Peer Commentary to Libet, 1985). A major line of 
criticism highlights potential errors in pinpointing the exact timing of conscious 
decisions with high precision (Breitmeyer, 1985; Joordens, van Duijn and Spalek, 
2002; Latto, 1985; van de Grind, 2002). The perceptual difficulty of judging the 
precise position of a dot rotating at high angular velocity would only have been 
exacerbated by the additional dual-task demands of having to simultaneously monitor 
one’s internal mental state for an event (conscious decision) that may arise over time 
rather than happen instantaneously (Breitmeyer, 1985; Latto, 1985; Lau et al., 2006, 
2007). Thus, a difference of ~300 ms does not seem sufficient to conclusively 
establish that the RP onset actually preceded the conscious decisions. 
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This concern might be alleviated if neural precursors of conscious decisions 
could be traced further back in time. Crucially, these EEG studies essentially focused 
only on the later stages of motor planning. It has since been confirmed by studying the 
Bereitschaftsmagnetfeld or readiness field (RF), the magnetoencephalographic 
equivalent of the RP (Deecke et al., 1982), in a lesion study (Deecke et al., 1987) and 
by using a conjunction of EEG and fMRI (Ball et al., 1999), that the RP originates 
from cortical regions involved in motor planning and execution, pre-SMA and SMA. 
It has been proposed that the motor RP might itself be preceded by unconscious neural 
activity in other regions related to the formation of intentions at a higher, non-motoric 
level (Haggar & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983; Groll-Knapp et al., 1977). However, 
in spite of its high temporal resolution, EEG may not be the optimal medium for 
providing the neural measurements needed to answer these questions, for the 
following reasons. 
The first major issue is that of temporal range; various experimental 
constraints conspired to limit the temporal range that the EEG intention clock 
paradigm could interrogate. In fact, Haggard and Eimer (1999) reported that they 
could not find any clear baseline within the 2.6 s (one clock cycle) pre-movement 
epoch, i.e., the RP onset appeared to have occurred even earlier. Unfortunately, neural 
activity further back than one revolution of the intention clock could not be 
conclusively attributed to the spontaneous action. Participants triggered each trial with 
a key press, and had to wait for at least one full clock cycle before making a 
spontaneous motor decision. Thus, any neural activity earlier than one clock cycle 
before could potentially be due to the trial-initiating key press rather than the 
upcoming spontaneous action (Haggard and Eimer, 1999). 
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This limitation could conceivably be circumvented with some tweaks in the 
experimental design, but the issue of blinking, which causes strong EEG artefacts, 
poses greater challenges. Participants in the original Libet study (Libet et al., 1983) 
were explicitly asked not to blink once the clock revolution started, until they had 
made the spontaneous button press. If they did blink, they had to wait for another full 
revolution of the clock before making a ‘spontaneous’ button press, i.e., their 
‘spontaneity’ could only occur between blinks. The seemingly innocuous requirement 
to avoid blinking would most likely have interfered with the spontaneity of the motor 
decision. The need to blink also effectively curtailed the temporal range of intention 
formation that EEG signals could interrogate based on this paradigm (Libet, 1985). 
The second issue relates to the poor spatial resolution of EEG signals. To link 
any neural activity to intention formation, it would be more convincing if one could 
distinguish the signals for different choice options. Haggard and Eimer (1999) were 
able to use the LRP to differentiate the preparatory neural activity specific to each 
voluntary action (left and right button presses) because the signals came from 
spatially segregated motor cortices. However, this strategy might not be effective 
when probing the initiation of voluntary actions at a non-motoric level, as neural 
signals specific to comparable intentions would likely involve similar gross brain 
regions, albeit encoded by distinct fine-grained activation patterns that spatially 
overlap (Haynes et al., 2007). The poor spatial precision of EEG and the inverse 
problem of localizing the current source(s) (Niedermeyer & da Silva, 2004) means 
that neighbouring current sources cannot be effectively dissociated. While more 
advanced EEG source reconstruction methods are now available (e.g., Ball et al., 1999; 
Knösche et al., 1996), the spatial specificity and reliability are unlikely to be sufficient 
for differentiating abstract decisions. 
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1.4 General Paradigm 
The above reasons prompted us to re-design the intention clock for use with 
pattern classification techniques in fMRI to search for unconscious neural signals 
related to high-level intention formation. The goal was to probe further back in time 
for the initiation of spontaneous decisions, rather than observe its manifestation at a 
late motoric stage. While fMRI has poorer temporal resolution than EEG, a longer 
time range of pre-decision neural activity could be interrogated, as there was no need 
to avoid eyeblinks since they were not associated with fMRI artefacts. Its superior 
spatial resolution also allowed us to capitalize on new multivariate classification 
techniques to uncover information encoded in fine-grained local activation patterns 
that would be lost in surface EEG signals (Haxby et al., 2001; Haynes and Rees, 2005; 
Kamitani and Tong, 2005; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). If distinctive BOLD activation 
patterns within a cortical region could be used to decode different choice options, it 
would imply that the underlying neural activity was related to specific decisions and 
not generic preparation. 
1.4.1 Time for a new intention clock 
Given the challenges of reporting the exact time of conscious decisions with 
high precision, we chose instead to sacrifice temporal resolution for greater certainty 
in our intention clock. In all three studies, our intention clock was specifically 
designed to 1) optimize the certainty and accuracy of reporting conscious decision 
time, albeit at a lower temporal resolution, and 2) interrogate a longer period of time 
for intention formation (unlike previous EEG studies utilizing the Libet clock 
paradigm, we did not have to avoid eyeblinks). 
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To avoid inaccuracies in time judgement that could occur with stimuli rotating 
at high angular velocity (van de Grind, 2002), our intention clock consisted of a visual 
stream of consonants, presented serially at 2 Hz in Studies 1 and 2, and 1 Hz in Study 
3. These temporal resolutions were slow enough for accurate identification of 
consonants, but more than sufficient for identifying the functional brain image 
acquired when the decision was made (time of repetition for each whole-brain image, 
TR, was 2.0 s in Studies 1 and 3, and 1.5 s in Study 2). Participants were asked to 
simply remember the consonant displayed on the screen when they became aware of 
their conscious decision. Consonants were presented in a pseudo-randomized order 
such that no repetition occurred within 8 consecutive consonants. The unpredictable 
sequence ensured that participants would not be biased by expectation effects when 
they reported which consonant was presented as their decision became conscious. 
To identify neural signals specific to a decision rather than generic task 
preparation, in all studies, participants were completely free to choose between two 
different but comparable options: left or right button press in Studies 1 and 2; simple 
single-digit addition or subtraction in Study 3. The options were designed to be 
relatively balanced – in the sense that there was no specific reason to prefer one 
option over the other – with the aim to increase the likelihood of participants making 
free choices without worrying about reward or penalty in decision outcome. In other 
words, unlike economic decisions, there was no need for deliberative evaluation of the 
pros and cons of each option, thus facilitating the spontaneity of decisions. 
Nevertheless, in order to ensure sufficient trials for each choice, and to avoid biased 
sampling during classification, we conducted a behavioural selection test before each 
fMRI experiment. Only participants who chose both options with roughly similar 
probability – in spite of explicit instructions that balancing their choices was 
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unnecessary, and that each choice should be made independently without regard to 
their history of choices – were selected for scanning. Participants were never informed 
that balanced choices were preferred throughout both behavioural and fMRI 
experiments. 
As in Libet et al. (1983), we asked participants to relax as each trial began. In 
addition, they were specifically asked not to be too eager to perform a task, or to 
maintain a heightened state of readiness because they were taking part in an 
experiment. Rather, they should stay in a relaxed state of mind while monitoring when 
they first felt the urge to initiate a chosen voluntary action. This allowed us to observe 
earlier build-up of neural activity related to the formation of the specific intention, 
rather than just later stages of its execution. The goal was to evaluate the stable fMRI 
baseline up to a few seconds – rather than just hundreds of milliseconds – before the 
conscious decision for early signal changes that encoded the decision outcome. 
1.4.2 Searching for intentions in dynamic brain patterns 
Conventional univariate analyses of fMRI data typically involve running an 
independent t-test or general linear model (GLM) at every voxel, looking for 
information at the single-voxel level. Raw data is usually smoothed over a few 
neighbouring voxels (between 4 to 12 mm) to increase signal to noise ratio, i.e., signal 
differences between contiguous voxels are essentially treated as noise within a 
functional region. However, in recent years it has been shown that such local 
differences in activity may actually constitute fine-grained spatial patterns that encode 
valuable information, which can be revealed using multi-voxel pattern analyses 
(MVPA) (Carlson et al., 2003; Cox and Savoy, 2003; Haxby et al., 2001; Haynes and 
Rees, 2005; Kamitani and Tong, 2005; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2004).  
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To uncover functional regions involved in the formation of free decisions in an 
unbiased fashion, we used a ‘searchlight’ approach (Haynes et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte 
et al., 2006) which examined the information contained in local spatial patterns of 
brain activity, one searchlight (local cluster of voxels) at a time. This was done 
independently for consecutive time-points before and after conscious decisions were 
made to yield a spatiotemporal brain map of decision-related information. 
For each brain voxel we investigated whether its local environment contained 
spatial activation patterns that would allow decoding of the participant’s decision. For 
a given voxel vi we first defined a cluster of N voxels c1…N found within a small 
sphere of fixed radius centered on vi. The signal magnitudes of each brain voxel c1…N 
in the fixed local cluster were extracted separately for each decision option A and B: 
left versus right button press in Studies 1 and 2; simple addition versus subtraction in 
Study 3. This was done separately for a range of time-points t before and after the 
conscious intention arose, and for each functional imaging run acquired from every 
participant. (Each experiment consisted of 10 short 5-min runs.) This yielded two N-
dimensional pattern vectors xA,t,r,1…N and xB,t,r,1...N for each run r and time-point t, 
representing the time-resolved spatial response patterns in the local cluster in trials 
where the participant chose option A versus option B. 
For a given time-point t and spatial position vi we used linear support vector 
machine (SVM) classification (Müller et al., 2001; implemented in LIBSVM) to 
assess how much decision-related information was encoded in the activity pattern of 
the searchlight cluster. The pattern vectors xA,t,r,1…N and xB,t,r,1...N for one functional 
run was kept aside as an independent ‘test’ data set, while the other vectors were 
assigned to a ‘training’ data set. The signal magnitude for each voxel c1…N in the 
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searchlight cluster constituted one axis of an N-dimensional space. Each N-
dimensional vector is a point in this N-dimensional space. The SVM algorithm 
essentially attempted to determine the hyperplane in this multi-dimensional space that 
optimally separated the two classes of training vectors, decision options A and B (with 
fixed regularisation parameter C=1). 
 
Fig. 1-1. Multi-voxel decoding from local spatial patterns using a moving 
‘searchlight’. Surrounding each voxel vi a searchlight consisting of a spherical 
cluster of voxels is defined. A multivariate decoding algorithm based on 
support vector classifiers (Müller et al., 2001) is used to assess how accurately 
this local pattern of brain activity encoded the participant’s decision to choose 
option A or B. For illustrative purposes, voxels more active for A are rendered 
in blue, and those more active for B in yellow. The decoding accuracy is 
estimated separately for a range of time-points immediately before and after 
the moment of conscious decision, which is reported via the consonant clock. 
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The amount of intention-related information present within this local cluster 
could then be assessed by examining how accurately the remaining vectors from the 
independent ‘test’ data set could be classified as being associated with choosing 
option A, or B. Good classification implied that the local cluster of voxels spatially 
encoded information about the specific decision of the participant. To ensure that the 
classification accuracy was not spurious, the training and test procedure was repeated 
multiple times, with each cross-validation cycle having a different run assigned as the 
test data set. The result was a decoding accuracy in the local environment of the 
central voxel vi, averaged over all cross-validation cycles. This procedure was 
repeated for each time-point t and each spatial position vi. This enabled us to create a 
3-dimensional spatial map of decoding accuracy for each time-point t before and after 
the conscious decision. From these accuracy maps we could identify brain regions that 
encoded the specific decision outcome with above-chance accuracy at various time-
points. We were also able to visualize for each region the information timecourse 
leading up to the conscious decision and following its execution. Comparing the 
temporal order of information across different decision-related regions provided an 
insight of the network of activity underlying intention formation and execution. 
This searchlight approach was used to search across the whole brain for 
intention-related information in local brain activity patterns in all three experimental 
studies. Besides decoding which options participants chose, similar searchlight 
decoding analyses were also performed independently to predict when a conscious 
decision would occur in Studies 1 and 3. This allowed us to determine whether the 
same brain regions were involved in choosing what to do, and when to do it. 
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1.5 Overview of studies and research questions 
In a series of three fMRI studies, we investigated the neural activity preceding 
conscious decisions to perform simple motor and abstract actions to look for decision-
predictive information. The existence of such pre-conscious information that was 
predictive of subjects’ choices would imply that our conscious decisions may be 
shaped by unconscious neural factors, via mechanisms which we are not explicitly 
aware of. 
1.5.1 Study 1: Decoding the unconscious formation of motor intentions 
We first looked for neural activity patterns across the brain that were 
predictive of spontaneous, free motor decisions (Soon et al., 2008). Specifically, we 
were interested in high-level networks involved in intention formation in addition to 
motor execution. 
Research questions: 
1.   Can the outcome of a free motor decision (left- or right-handed button 
press) be predicted from neural activity patterns occurring before it enters 
conscious awareness? 
2.   Can the timing of a spontaneous motor decision (self-paced) be predicted 
from neural activity patterns occurring before it enters conscious 
awareness? 
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1.5.2 Study 2: Temporal stability of neural patterns involved in intention 
formation 
In the second study, we sought to better characterize the spatiotemporal 
dynamics of neural information related to intention formation in prefrontal cortex 
using higher spatial and temporal resolution made possible by a more powerful 7T 
scanner (Bode et al., 20112). 
1.   Can the findings from Study 1 be replicated? 
2.   Can improved spatial and temporal fMRI resolution shed more light on 
how intention-related information evolves over time and lead to a 
conscious decision? 
1.5.3 Study 3: Decoding the unconscious formation of abstract intentions 
In the final study, we used a novel abstract intention task that completely 
dissociated the abstract choice from motor responses to verify whether the neural 
networks involved in the formation of motor decisions were also involved in shaping 
abstract decisions (Soon et al., 2013). 
1.   Can the outcome and timing of spontaneous free abstract decisions (to 
perform addition or subtraction) be predicted from neural activity patterns 
occurring before it enters conscious awareness? 
2.   Are choice-predictive signals for both motor and abstract decisions related 
to default mode network activity? 
 
 
                                                
2 I was a co-author on this paper, and contributed to the design of the experiment and 
manuscript preparation. 
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2.1 Abstract 
There has been a long controversy whether subjectively ‘free’ decisions are in 
fact determined by brain activity ahead of time. Previous reports that neural changes 
in motor-related cortex precede conscious decisions have been criticized for 
inaccuracies in subjective reports of decision time. These studies also left unanswered 
whether intentions to act are initiated in motor-related cortex, or in high-level brain 
areas. In an fMRI study, we found that the outcome of a decision could be decoded 
from brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before entering 
awareness. Such a long delay could not be attributed to inaccuracies in measuring the 
time of conscious decisions. Instead it presumably reflected the operation of a 
network of high-level control areas that began to prepare upcoming decisions long 
before they entered awareness. This suggests that our free choices are determined by 
brain activity much earlier than commonly appreciated. 
Key words:  intention; decision; free will; self-paced; Libet; readiness potential 
Study 1: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Motor Intentions 23 
 
 
2.2 Introduction 
The impression that we are able to freely choose between different possible 
courses of action is fundamental to our mental life. However, it has been suggested 
that this subjective experience of freedom is no more than an illusion and that our 
actions are initiated by unconscious mental processes long before we become aware 
of our intention to act (Haggard, 2005; Libet et al., 1983; Wegner, 2003). In a 
previous experiment (Libet et al., 1983), electrical brain activity was recorded while 
participants made a flexion their fingers and/or wrist as soon as they felt the urge to 
do so. Notably, their conscious decision to initiate a movement was preceded by a few 
hundred milliseconds by a negative brain potential, the so-called ‘readiness potential’ 
(RP) that originates from the supplementary motor area (SMA), a brain region 
involved in motor preparation. Since brain activity in the SMA consistently preceded 
the conscious decision, it has been argued that the brain had already unconsciously 
made a decision to move even before the participant became aware of it. 
However, these intriguing experiments have left a number of controversial 
questions open (Glynn, 1990; Joordens et al., 2002; van de Grind, 2002). First, the RP 
is generated by the SMA, and hence only provides information about late stages of 
motor planning. Thus, it is unclear whether the SMA is indeed the cortical site where 
the decision for a movement originates or whether high-level planning stages might 
be involved in unconsciously preparing the decision (Bechara et al., 1997), as was 
seen in studies on conscious action planning (Burgess et al., 2001; Haynes et al., 2007; 
Hampton & Doherty, 2007; Koechlin et al., 1999). Second, the time delay between the 
onset of the RP and the decision is only a few hundred milliseconds (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). It has been repeatedly argued that potential 
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inaccuracies in the behavioural measurement of the decision time at such short delays 
could lead one to misjudge the relative timing of brain activity and intention (Glynn, 
1990; Haggard, 2005; Joordens et al., 2002; van de Grind, 2002). Third, does any 
leading brain activity indeed selectively predict the specific outcome of a choice 
ahead of time? To rule out the idea that such activity merely reflects unspecific 
preparatory activation (Lau et al., 2004), it is necessary to study free decisions 
involving more than one behavioural option (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haynes et al., 
2007). 
In an fMRI study, we investigated how neural activity started shaping a 
spontaneous, free motor decision before it entered awareness. We directly evaluated 
which regions of the brain were involved in the formation of an intention to act, and 
the time at which their influences began. While their brain activity was measured 
using fMRI, participants carried out a spontaneous motor-decision task, freely 
choosing to make a button press with either their left or right hand, and reported 
exactly when the conscious decision was made (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 
1983). Searchlight-based MVPA was used to evaluate whether it was possible to 
predict the specific outcomes and timings of the free motor decisions from local brain 
activation patterns before their conscious inception. The amount of decision-related 
information was independently assessed for each brain region at various time-points 
before (and after) the participants’ conscious decisions. This highly sensitive 
technique allowed us to uncover a network of frontopolar and precuneus regions that 
were found to encode the decision outcomes up to 7 s before participants made their 
conscious decisions. The unexpectedly long temporal precedence of the unconscious 
neural information directly questioned the role of conscious decisions in simple acts 
of volition. 
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2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Participants 
Thirty-six healthy right-handed participants who gave informed written 
consent (18 female, age range 21 – 30 years) were tested in a behavioural selection 
test, from which 14 participants (seven female, age range 21 – 30 years) were selected 
to participate in the fMRI experiment. All participants were healthy and had normal or 
corrected to normal vision, and had no history of neurological disease. Two 
participants were subsequently excluded from further analysis due to their behavioural 
performance during the fMRI session (see Results). 
The study was approved by the local ethics committee at the Max Planck 
Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany. The study was 
carried out in accordance to the Declaration of Helsinki. Informed written consent 
was obtained from each participant before the study. 
2.3.2 Behavioural paradigm 
Participants performed a freely paced motor decision task while their brain 
activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (Fig. 2-1). At the 
beginning of each trial period, consonants were presented in the middle of the screen, 
one at a time for 500 ms without gap, and participants were asked to passively 
observe this letter stream. This modification to Libet’s clock measurements was made 
to render the sequence unpredictable, and also to avoid inaccuracies in time 
judgement that can occur with rotating stimuli (van de Grind, 2002). The order of 
presentation was randomized under the constraint that there were no repetitions within 
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a sequence of 8 consonants. Participants were told to relax and to press either the left 
or right button with the index finger of the corresponding hand immediately when 
they became aware of the urge to do so. They were to remember the consonant that 
was on the screen when they made the conscious decision which button to press (and 
not when the button was actually pressed). After the button was pressed, the screen 
went blank for 2,000 ms. Then, a response mapping screen was presented for 2,000 
ms. This showed three consonants and a hash symbol (‘#’) arranged in a square 
configuration. The three consonants were the last three consonants that were 
presented (‘0-back’, ‘1-back’ and ‘2-back’ relative to the button press). The 
configuration of choices was randomized so that participants could not plan and 
prepare which motor action to execute before the response mapping screen appeared. 
Participants were asked to indicate which consonant was on the screen when they 
made the decision which button to press. This gave an indication of the time when 
participants became conscious of the intention which button to press, covering a 
possible range of 0 – 1,500 ms prior to the actual button press. This time period was 
chosen based on the pilot experiments. For example, selecting the ‘1-back’ consonant 
would indicate that the participant was conscious of the intention about 500 – 1,000 
ms prior to the button press. If the consonant presented at the onset of the conscious 
intention was not available, participants were to select the hash (‘#’) symbol. Choice 
of this symbol indicated a delay of longer than 1,500 ms and suggested that the 
movement was not executed immediately when the conscious intention was felt, or 
that the participant was not paying attention to the consonants. The screen then went 
blank for 2,000 ms again before the next trial period began with the presentation of a 
new stream of consonants. 
Importantly, in order to facilitate spontaneous behaviour, we did not ask 
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participants to balance the left and right button selections. This would have required 
keeping track of the distribution of button selections (Spence and Frith, 1999) in 
memory and would also have encouraged preplanning of choices. Instead, we selected 
participants who spontaneously chose a balanced number of left and right button 
presses without prior instruction based on a behavioural selection test before. This 
was performed on a previous day and was carried out to select participants who were 
able to perform the task according to the above instructions. Each participant went 
through 10 runs, each lasting 5 minutes. A lateralization index was calculated to 
measure the ratio between total left button presses (L) and total right button presses (R) 
using the formula: (L–R)/(L+R). To increase the chances of getting approximately 
balanced distributions of left and right button choices during the fMRI session, only 
participants who had lateralization indices below 0.30 were selected for the fMRI 
experiment. Participants were not told of this criterion. In addition, participants were 
given only minor instructions to encourage the spontaneity of movement choice and 
execution. As in previous studies (Haggard and Eimer, 1999) we explicitly asked 
participants not to make button selections based on any kind of pattern. They were 
specifically asked not to be too eager to initiate a button press when the consonants 
first appeared, or to maintain a constant state of readiness for the movement. Instead, 
they should stay as relaxed as possible while looking at the consonants. This served 
two purposes. The first was to let their mental activity settle down to a stable state, so 
that any build-up of neural activity prior to the movement could be clearly observed. 
The second reason was to avoid the overlapping of haemodynamic responses from 
different trials, so as to facilitate unambiguous interpretation of the blood-oxygen-
level dependent (BOLD) signal prior to the button press. It was stressed to 
participants that the time and choice of movement was completely up to them, but that 
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it should be executed without hesitation once they made the decision which button to 
press. They were also asked to avoid any form of preplanning for choice of movement 
or time of execution. 
 
Fig. 2-1. Measuring the onset time of free conscious motor intentions. 
Participants viewed a letter stream that was updated every 500 ms (shown here 
only for a few frames). At some point they spontaneously made the decision to 
press either the left or right button using their corresponding index finger (free 
response). Subsequently, they were presented with a response-mapping screen 
that instructed participants as to which second button to press to report the time 
at which they consciously made the motor decision. 
2.3.3 Functional imaging and preprocessing 
A Bruker 3T Medspec 30/100 scanner (Ettlingen, Germany) was used to 
acquire functional MR EPI volumes with 30 slices at an isotropic resolution of 3×3×3 
mm resolution covering prefrontal, parietal and most of temporal cortex (TR=2,000 
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ms; TE=30 ms; tilt 10 degrees axial to coronal; FOV 192×192×90). Ten runs of 150 
functional MRI volumes were acquired for each participant. A 46-slice whole brain 
EPI image was also acquired to facilitate spatial normalization. 
Data were preprocessed using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). After 
discarding the first two images to allow for magnetic saturation effects, the remaining 
functional images were then realigned, correcting for head motion during the 
experiment. The functional images were then transformed into standard MNI space by 
first coregistering with a full-brain EPI image, followed by spatial normalization to 
the MNI EPI template. Then the functional images were subjected to two different 
types of analyses: 1) conventional univariate general linear model, and 2) novel 
searchlight-based multivariate pattern classification. 
2.3.4 General linear model 
We first performed conventional univariate analyses designed to identify brain 
regions where overall increases in neural activity occurred prior to the onset of a 
conscious decision. The preprocessed functional images were smoothed with a 6 mm 
FWHM Gaussian filter. Then a general linear model (GLM) was estimated for each 
participant with images concatenated across all runs. Since in our case there was no 
specific prediction regarding the temporal profile of the shape of the fMRI response 
timecourse, we used a finite impulse response (FIR) predictor to model fMRI 
responses (Henson, 2004). The freely chosen button selections were modelled using 
26 FIR regressors, 13 for left and 13 for right button presses, covering a time range 
from 10 s before until 16 s after the button press. The second button presses with 
which participants indicated the onset time of their conscious intention were modelled 
as covariates consisting of single events convolved with a standard haemodynamic 
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response function (HRF). The parameter estimates from the 26 FIR regressors of each 
participant were then entered into a second-level random-effects one-way ANOVA. 
The localisation of SMA and pre-SMA was based on standard criteria (Picard and 
Strick, 1996). 
2.3.5 Multivariate pattern analyses 
Next, we performed a set of multivariate pattern classification analyses based 
on the searchlight approach described in Chapter 1 (Haynes et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte 
et al., 2006; Norman et al., 2006) to identify cortical regions that contained decision-
related information even before the conscious decision was made.  
Decoding the content of motor decisions 
The goal of our main multivariate searchlight analysis was to classify whether 
the participant was about to press the left or right button even prior to their conscious 
decision to do so. We began by estimating a modified general linear model for each 
run with regressors as described above but now based on unsmoothed data. This 
change was made to maximize sensitivity and allow extraction of the full information 
present in the spatial patterns, which would have been reduced by smoothing. 
As described in Chapter 1, we interrogated local brain activity patterns for 
information related to the decision to press the left or right button using the 
searchlight approach (Fig. 1-1). As the searchlight picked out each spherical cluster 
(3-voxel radius) of neighbouring voxels, we extracted from the GLM of each run the 
26 unsmoothed parameter estimates, 13 for left button decisions, and 13 for right, 
covering 10 s before to 16 s after the button press. To estimate the timecourse of 
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intention-related information within this local cluster, we performed 13 independent 
sets of linear SVM analyses (Müller et al., 2001; LIBSVM implementation, 
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm), one at each two-second time-point t. 
In each set of classification analysis, SVM classifiers were trained on data 
from nine runs to distinguish the left button decisions from the right, and tested on the 
last run. This was repeated in ten cross-validation cycles, each time with a different 
run as the test run (10-fold cross-validation). The average decoding accuracy for each 
searchlight cluster was then assigned to the center voxel, and used to create 3-
dimensional information brain maps of motor intention-related activity. This yielded 
13 brain maps of predictive accuracy for each participant, one for each time-point 
relative to the onset of the conscious intention. 
As the participants’ EPI images had previously been normalized to a common 
stereotactic template it was possible to perform a second-level analysis where we 
computed on a voxel-by-voxel basis how well decoding could be performed on 
average across all participants from each time-point and each position in the brain. 
For this purpose the decoding images were smoothed with a 6 mm FWHM Gaussian 
filter. These smoothed brain maps of local decoding accuracy were entered into a one-
way ANOVA with 13 levels, one for each time-point. Regions that predicted the 
subsequently chosen button were identified using a t-contrast based on all time-points 
prior to the decision onset (using a family-wise error correction for multiple 
comparisons, 50-voxel cluster-size threshold). 
Control analysis: Decoding decision outcome from motion parameters 
In order to exclude that decoding was influenced by potential head motion 
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correlated with the participant’s decision we investigated whether it was possible to 
decode the outcome of the decision from movement parameters obtained from motion 
correction. For this analysis the 6 motion correction parameters (x-translation, y-
translation, z-translation, x-rotation, y-rotation and z-rotation) were extracted 
separately for left and right choice trials, and separately for 13 time-points t from 10 s 
before until 16 s after the conscious decision. This covered the same temporal range 
as the main decoding analysis. For each time-point t, this yielded two sets of 6-
dimensional pattern vectors of each run, representing the estimated motion related to 
participants choosing left versus right button presses. We then used multivariate 
pattern recognition with a linear SVM to assess whether the participant’s head motion 
provided any information about left versus right button choices at each time-point t. 
Again, the model was trained using data from nine runs, and tested on the independent 
tenth run. This training and testing cycle was repeated 10 times, with a different run as 
the test data set each time (10-fold cross-validation). For each time-point t, the 
classification accuracies across participants were then assessed using Student’s t-test. 
Decoding the timing of motor decisions 
We also conducted a further decoding analysis where we assessed to which 
degree the timing of the decision, rather than its outcome, could be decoded. A multi-
class pattern classification analysis was performed to identify cortical areas which 
contained early predictive information about when participants would decide to make 
a button press. As in the main decoding analysis described above, a spherical 
searchlight approach was used. For each spherical cluster (radius of 3 voxels), a 
multi-class support vector machine was trained to classify the time bin which a 
particular data point came from. Correct identification of the time bin prior to the time 
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of conscious intention indicated that it was possible to predict how much later the 
conscious intention would occur. Six time bins (six possible classes) were interrogated, 
covering 10 s to 0 s before the button press. Again, 10-fold cross-validation was 
performed, each cycle involving nine training runs and one independent test run. The 
searchlight went through the whole brain, yielding 6 brain maps of classification 
accuracy for each participant, one for each time-point before the conscious intention. 
To assess statistical significance across participants, a one-way ANOVA with 6 levels, 
one for each time-point, was performed on smoothed decoding accuracy images (6 
mm FWHM Gaussian filter).  
2.3.6 Post-scan behavioural control: Unconstrained clock time 
A post-scan behavioural control experiment was conducted to further 
corroborate the timing measurements obtained during the fMRI session. First, we 
addressed the question of whether the brief delay between intention and motor 
response reported by the participants might be due to the limited number of response 
alternatives for reporting the letter that was on the screen when the decision was made. 
Second, using the same procedure we also asked participants to rate the time when 
they decided to press any button rather than which specific button to press to find out 
if they involved different decision processes. This also explicitly tested for whether 
participants pre-decided either when to press a button or which button to press. 
Eight out of 12 participants from the fMRI experiment who were still available 
returned for the post-scan behavioural control experiment. Participants performed the 
same free motor decision task as in the fMRI experiment. However, they were 
allowed to respond with any consonant on the keyboard in order to report the time of 
their motor decision (i.e., yielding 21 possible alternative times or up to 10.5 seconds). 
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In five consecutive runs, they reported when they decided to press a specific button, 
left or right (‘Left/Right decision’). In another five runs, they reported when they 
decided to press any (nonspecific) button (‘Time decision’). The order of runs was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
2.3.7 Control fMRI experiment: Delayed motor intentions 
Finally, in order to further investigate the functional roles of frontopolar cortex 
and precuneus, we conducted a control fMRI experiment to investigate which area 
first contained information about the decision outcome during the conscious free 
selection of a motor action. In this paradigm, the time-points of motor action selection 
and execution (after a few seconds’ delay) were both cued and thus under 
experimental control. This allowed us to identify informative brain regions at the 
precise time of selection, and to dissociate these from brain regions where information 
arose during the storage or response period. 
Seven participants performed 10 runs of a delayed motor intention task. On 
each trial participants freely decided whether to make a left or right button press when 
shown the cue ‘select’. The chosen response was not executed immediately, but the 
choice had to be maintained over a variable delay period (randomly distributed 
between 4 to 10 s), and was executed when a second cue, ‘respond’, was presented. 
Each participant was cued to perform 16 such trials per run, resulting in 160 trials in 
total. In each run 120 volumes were scanned. Otherwise scanning parameters were the 
same as in the main experiment (30 slices with an isotropic resolution of 3×3×3 mm 
resolution covering prefrontal, parietal and most of temporal cortex; TR = 2,000 ms; 
TE = 30 ms; tilt 10 degrees axial to coronal; field of view 192×192×90). 
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After preprocessing as in the main experiment, a GLM was estimated for each 
run. The three phases ‘Select’, ‘Delay’ and ‘Response’ were modelled separately for 
left and right decision trials. The variable delay allowed for effective deconvolution of 
the three phases in each trial. We then investigated which cortical regions contained 
information about the decision (left or right button press) during each of the three 
phases using the searchlight approach, as described before. 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Behavioural results 
Out of the 14 participants who were scanned, two were subsequently excluded 
from further analysis based on their behavioural performance during the fMRI session. 
One participant showed disproportionately more frequent selection of right button 
presses (lateralization index of –0.37), which might lead to unbalanced estimation 
accuracy of the BOLD response. The other participant selected the ‘#’ symbol for 
24.5% of button presses, suggesting that many of her button presses were not 
spontaneous. The remaining participants had an average lateralization index of 0.01. 
The freely paced button presses occurred, on average, 21.6 s after trial onset, 
thus leaving sufficient time to estimate any potential buildup of a ‘cortical decision’ 
without contamination by previous trials. Both the left and right response buttons 
were pressed equally often and most of the decisions (88.6%) were reported to be 
consciously formed within 1,000 ms before the button press (Fig. 2-2). On a small 
number of trials (8.5%) participants reported that the decision had preceded the 
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response by between 1,000 and 1,500 ms. The ‘#’ option was rarely chosen (1.4%) 
and mainly ensured that the participant was performing the task as instructed. Hence, 
in most trials the reported conscious decision occurred within the fMRI volume 
preceding the button press. Please note that the temporal resolution with which the 
judgement was measured was four times higher than the resolution of our fMRI 
measurements and thus fully sufficient for the present purposes of investigating long-
term generation of conscious intentions to act. 
 
 
Fig. 2-2. Distribution of judged conscious decision time. In 90.1% of the 
trials, participants were conscious of their motor decisions within 1,000 ms 
before the freely selected button press. 
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2.4.2 Functional imaging results 
Decoding the content of motor decisions 
We directly assessed how much information each brain region contained about 
the specific outcome of a motor decision at various time-points before and after it 
reached awareness. We first investigated which brain regions the spontaneous motor 
decision could be decoded from after it had reached awareness and the chosen motor 
action was being executed. As expected, two sets of brain regions encoded the 
outcome of the participant’s motor decision during the execution phase: bilateral 
primary motor cortex and SMA (p<.05, family-wise error corrected; Fig. 2-3). 
Next, we addressed the key question of this study, whether any brain region 
encoded the participant’s motor decision ahead of time. Indeed, we found that two 
brain regions encoded with high accuracy whether the participant was about to choose 
the left or right response prior to the conscious decision (p<.05, family-wise error 
corrected; Fig. 2-3, 2-4 & 2-5). The first region was in frontopolar cortex, BA10. The 
predictive information in the fMRI signals from this brain region was already present 
7 s before the motor decision entered awareness. Taking into account the sluggishness 
of BOLD responses with respect to neural activity, the predictive neural information 
would have preceded the conscious motor decision by up to 10 s. There was a second 
predictive region located in parietal cortex stretching from the precuneus into 
posterior cingulate cortex. 
 
Study 1: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Motor Intentions 38 
 
 
 
Study 1: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Motor Intentions 39 
 
 
Fig. 2-3. Decoding the outcome of motor decisions before and after they 
reach conscious awareness. Color-coded brain areas show regions where the 
specific outcome of a motor decision could be decoded before (bottom, green) 
and after (top, red) it had been made. The graphs separately depict for each 
time-point the accuracy with which the participants’ free choices to press the 
left or right button could be decoded from the spatial pattern of brain activity 
in that region (solid line, left axis; filled symbols, significant at p<.05; open 
symbols, not significant; error bars, s.e.m.; chance level, 50%). The vertical 
red line shows the earliest time at which the participants became aware of their 
choices. The dashed (right) vertical line in each graph shows the onset of the 
next trial. The inset in the bottom left shows the representative spatial pattern 
of preference of the most discriminative searchlight position in frontopolar 
cortex for one participant (ant: anterior; sup: superior; see Fig. 2-6). 
When the statistical threshold was relaxed and the cluster-size threshold 
removed, several other smaller regions became apparent that had significant 
predictive information, albeit less pronounced (Table 2-1). These regions were mainly 
aligned along the medial wall of prefrontal cortex, especially in anterior medial 
prefrontal cortex, and to a lesser degree near the SMA. 
Table 2-1. Brain areas encoding intention prior to conscious decision 
MNI coordinates 
Z Score Cortical region 
X Y Z 
33 69 12 6.58 Frontopolar cortex 
0 60 –3 5.12 Anterior medial prefrontal cortex 
3 60 –15 4.90 Anterior medial prefrontal cortex 
–21 45 9 5.26 Anterior cingulate cortex 
3 18 51 4.97 Pre-SMA 
–12 –60 21 6.98 Posterior cingulate cortex 
3 –57 39 5.20 Precuneus 
Note. Relaxed threshold: p<.00001, uncorrected; no cluster-size threshold. 
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Fig. 2-4. BOLD and information timecourses in all regions containing 
intention-related information. The left column shows brain regions from 
which the outcome of a decision could be decoded either before or after it had 
reached awareness. The plot depicts separately for each time-point the 
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accuracy with which the participants’ free decisions to press the left or right 
button could be decoded from the spatial pattern of brain activity in that region 
(solid line, left axis; filled symbols, significant at p<.05; open symbols, not 
significant; error bars, s.e.m.; chance level, 50%). The vertical red line shows 
the earliest time when the participants made their decision. The dotted (right) 
vertical line in each graph shows the onset of the next trial. The middle column 
shows BOLD activity averaged across searchlight voxels for each region and 
each time-point. The overall signal at each time-point was also plotted 
separately for the left and right button presses (green and blue dashed lines). 
The grey dashed line in the left column directly plots the difference between 
these overall activity levels (right axis). The right column shows the results of 
an additional analysis where a classifier was trained to recognize at which of 6 
time windows the decision would be made rather than which outcome it would 
have (thus, chance level is here 16.7%). 
In order to visualise the information dynamics across different brain regions, 
we plotted the time-resolved classification accuracies and BOLD timecourses of each 
region of interest (Fig. 2-4). To assess whether any predictive information was caused 
by overall signal differences between the two conditions, rather than by the local 
micro-pattern of brain activity, the overall signals for the left and right button presses 
(middle column blue and green dashed lines respectively), and the difference between 
them (left column grey dashed line) were also plotted separately at each time-point.  
In all brain regions except the primary motor cortex, the overall activity for 
left and right decisions was virtually identical to the average response, and hence not 
visible on the graphs (Fig. 2-4). Only the contralateral motor cortex showed clear 
differences in overall signal for the two conditions, with right motor cortex being 
more strongly activated by left button presses and vice versa. Correspondingly, the 
decision could be accurately decoded at the time-points showing such global 
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differences. As expected, this occurred after the participant had decided for the left or 
right button press, and reflected the execution of the chosen motor action. While these 
motor-related brain regions showed a gradual increase in activity across the pre-
decision period, this activity was unspecific for the choices and carried no predictive 
information for the outcome of the decision (chance-level classification). In contrast, 
during this preparation period, the frontopolar and precuneus / posterior cingulate 
regions already encoded the content of the upcoming decision, even though there was 
no overall signal increase or difference between left and right choices. This suggested 
that the decoded information was based not on global differences as in the motor 
cortex, but on differences in local micro-patterns of fMRI signals (see for example, 
Fig. 2-6), which is presumably why it has not been noticed before in univariate 
analyses. 
As might be expected, the decoding accuracy was generally higher in cortical 
areas involved in the motor execution of the response than in areas shaping the 
upcoming decision before it reached awareness (Fig. 2-3 & 2-4; note the difference in 
scale). However, when the BOLD signals from the early predictive regions, lateral 
frontopolar and precuneus / posterior cingulate cortex, were combined in a separate 
classification analysis, the prediction accuracy improved, as would be expected when 
pooling informative pattern signals (Fig. 2-5). 
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Fig. 2-5. Information profiles across multiple brain regions. Average 
decoding accuracy across 4 time-points before the decision (black) and 4 time-
points after the decision (grey). The two leftmost bar plots show the combined 
decoding accuracy when pooling signals from the two most predictive brain 
regions: frontopolar and precuneus / posterior cingulate cortex.  
Interestingly, there was a clear dissociation between brain regions encoding 
the outcome of the upcoming decision before it was consciously made and brain 
regions encoding this information following the decision (Fig. 2-4 & 2-5). Only SMA 
appeared to be involved in both phases. Even before the execution phase, SMA 
already showed an earlier choice-encoding phase beginning around 5 s prior to the 
conscious decision during which the upcoming decision could be predicted before it 
entered awareness (Fig. 2-4). 
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Fig. 2-6. Example of voxel selectivity for a representative searchlight. The 
spherical clusters at the position with peak decoding accuracy in frontopolar 
cortex are shown for all 12 participants. The selectivity for each voxel for 
either a left or right decision is colour coded in blue and yellow respectively. 
The selectivity profiles clearly indicate that some voxels are activated stronger 
preceding either left or right decisions, thus pointing towards a distributed 
encoding of long-term predictive information. 
Control analysis: Decoding decision outcome from motion parameters 
To verify whether our decoding results were influenced by motion we also 
attempted to decode the outcome of a decision directly from the estimated movement 
of the participant. However, the motion parameters contained no information related 
to the decision (p>0.2 for all time-points), hence precluding that our results were 
driven by head motion artefacts (Fig. 2-7). 
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Fig. 2-7. Decoding the outcome of a decision from motion parameters. 
Head motion did not significantly predict button choice at any time-point 
(p>0.2 for all time-points). 
Decoding the timing of decisions 
We also assessed the degree to which the timing of the decision could be 
predicted ahead of time. Indeed, the neural activity in pre-SMA and SMA leading up 
to the motor decision was found to be informative about the decision timing (t-
contrast based on all time-points, family-wise error correction, 50-voxel cluster 
threshold). Time-points from as early as 5 s before the motor decision onwards could 
be correctly identified (Fig. 2-4, right column). There was a linear increase in 
classification accuracy as the conscious intention approached. In contrast, in the 
frontopolar cortex timing information was only possible just before the motor 
decision. 
Study 1: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Motor Intentions 46 
 
 
As the time bins chosen for the analysis and the time relative to the decision 
were not independent, we performed an additional analysis to test whether decoding 
was indeed possible when focusing only on two early time-points. We conducted a 
new time decoding analysis using only two of the earlier time-points: 1) the earliest 
time-point showing above chance classification (6 seconds prior to decision), and 2) 
the earliest time-point interrogated (10 seconds prior to decision). As in the earlier 
analyses, a spherical searchlight (radius of 3 voxels) approach was used. For each 
spherical cluster, an SVM model was trained to classify which of the two time bins a 
particular data point came from. Again, 10-fold cross-validation was performed, each 
cycle involving 9 training runs and one independent test run. This yielded 2 images of 
classification accuracy for each participant, one for each time bin tested. These 
images were smoothed (6 mm FWHM Gaussian filter) before a second level random 
effects group analysis was performed. As in the earlier time-decoding analysis, 
decoding accuracy in the pre-SMA was above chance (56.7%, p<.00001, uncorrected). 
This indicated that, akin to EEG analyses on free decision generation (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983), before a conscious decision was made, neural 
changes occurred in pre-SMA, resulting in activation patterns that were 
distinguishable from the preceding baseline activity. This in turn revealed that a 
decision to act would occur in a few seconds. 
2.4.3 Results of post-scan behavioural control: Unconstrained clock time 
In the post-scan behavioural control experiment, when allowed to indicate the 
time of conscious decision with any consonant instead of a limited number of choices, 
participants still indicated that the delay between decision and button press was below 
one second (Fig. 2-8). In separate experimental blocks, participants indicated either 
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the time point of decisions for a specific button (as in the fMRI experiment) or the 
time point for the less specific decision to press any button. Both the decisions for the 
button and for the timing were made approximately at the same time just preceding 
the actual button press. There was no significant difference between the ‘Left / Right’ 
decisions (–962 ms, s.e.m. = 149 ms) and the ‘Time’ decisions (–866 ms, s.e.m. = 65 
ms), t7<1, and both decisions were made within one second before the freely selected 
button press. This confirmed that participants were making the motor decisions at a 
much later stage than the long-leading brain activity that was predictive of their 
response. 
 
Fig. 2-8. Post-scan behavioural control experiment on decision timing. 
Participants were required to judge either the timing of their decision to press 
either the left or right button (‘Left / Right Decision’) or the timing of their 
decision to press any button (‘Time Decision’). The symbols show the average 
reported timing judgements separately for each participant. Reports for both of 
these decision times were within 1,000 ms preceding the motor response (0 ms) 
and long after the earliest prediction of the Left / Right decision from brain 
activity. 
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2.4.4 Results of control fMRI experiment: Delayed motor intention 
In a separate control experiment, we investigated whether the content of a 
delayed motor decision could be decoded from neural activity in frontopolar cortex 
and precuneus 1) at the point of decision (‘Select’), 2) during a variable delay period 
after decision but before execution (‘Delay’), and 3) during the actual execution of the 
motor action (‘Response’). 
In a small percentage of trials (3.30%), participants failed to make a response 
within 2 s after the ‘respond’ cue was presented. These trials were discarded from the 
analyses because participants may not have been paying sufficient attention to the task 
during these trials. Overall, participants chose roughly the same number of left and 
right responses (all individual lateralization indices <0.20; average lateralization index 
= −0.04). 
Through delaying the motor execution of the decision, a temporal order of 
decision-related information across brain regions became evident. Frontopolar cortex 
was the first cortical region which contained information about the decision once 
participants were cued to decide (Fig. 2-9). The decision outcome could already be 
decoded from frontopolar cortex – but not precuneus – during the ‘Select’ phase 
(p<.001, uncorrected). During the variable ‘Delay’ period both frontopolar cortex and 
precuneus contained predictive information about the decision (p<.001, uncorrected). 
During the ‘Response’ phase only precuneus contained information about the decision. 
If functional involvement could be inferred from information availability, this would 
imply different roles for frontopolar cortex (decision formation and maintenance) and 
precuneus (decision maintenance and execution). 
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Fig. 2-9. Decoding the outcome of delayed motor intentions. Decoding 
accuracy in frontopolar cortex and precuneus in a control experiment where 
participants were cued when to freely select one of two hands for a response. 
Predictive information regarding the selected hand arose first in frontopolar 
cortex (MNI coordinates 39, 45, 12), already during the selection, and only 
later in precuneus (MNI –9, –57, 45). In contrast to frontopolar cortex, the 
precuneus continued to encode the chosen hand during the response period. 
In addition, SMA (MNI 12, –3, 51) also contained information about which 
hand was selected, especially during the delay period, presumably because 
participants already started preparing for the upcoming motor action (Select: 59.3%, 
Delay: 67.3%, Response 60.0 %). Similarly, this information was available in the 
primary motor cortex once the decision was made (Select: 59.2%, Delay: 58.2%, 
Response 81.3 %; averaged across left and right). As in the main experiment, pre-
SMA (–9, 6, 57) had no predictive information during the selection period, but some 
information was present during the delay period (Select: 51.8 %, Delay: 57.0 %, 
Response: 54.2%). 
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2.5 Discussion 
In this fMRI study, we showed using time-resolved searchlight MVPA that a 
few seconds before a spontaneous free decision was consciously made, its outcome 
could already be predicted from local spatial activation patterns in frontopolar and 
precuneus / posterior cingulate cortex, even though there was no overall increase in 
BOLD signal in these regions. Once the decision reached conscious awareness, 
regions that were involved in executing the voluntary motor action, including the pre-
SMA, SMA and bilateral primary motor cortex began to encode the content of the 
decision. In contrast, the timing of the decision could be decoded from the pre-SMA 
and SMA a few seconds before reaching awareness, but not from the frontopolar and 
precuneus / posterior cingulate regions. Thus, there appeared to be a double 
dissociation in the very early stages of motor intention formation, between brain 
regions shaping the specific decision outcome and those determining the timing of the 
decision. In the light of these and other related findings (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; 
Libet et al., 1983), there might be a need to examine the relationship between 
conscious will and brain processes. 
Timing of intention-related information 
Up to ~7 s before a participant consciously decided to press a button, decision-
predictive information could already be detected in a network of frontal and parietal 
regions. Taking into consideration the delay in the haemodynamic response, this 
would suggest that when a participant’s decision reached awareness it had already 
been influenced by unconscious brain activity for up to 10 s. This preparatory 
timeframe in high-level control regions was considerably longer than the few hundred 
milliseconds between RP onset and conscious decisions typically reported in previous 
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EEG studies for motor-related brain regions (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 
1983). Thus, it is highly doubtful that our findings were due to inaccuracies in the 
behavioural measurements of the subjective decision time, a common criticism of 
EEG studies of free decisions (Glynn, 1990; Haggard, 2005; van de Grind, 2002). In 
our study, the main level of activity in motor-related brain regions began to increase 
as early as 5 s prior to the decision (Fig. 2-4). On the one hand, this was an order of 
magnitude earlier than previous work on the RP (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 
1983). On the other hand, this was actually not inconsistent with Haggard and Eimer’s 
(1999) observation that the motor-related RP had no clear baseline within 2.6 s before 
the movement, which implied that the onset of neural changes could have occurred 
much earlier. One potential explanation is that decision time in our study was 
unconstrained, and participants did not have to be concerned with eyeblinks, so 
possibly unspecific preparatory activity was able to build up over a longer period of 
time. Instructions to relax rather than maintain a state of readiness to act probably also 
allowed us to observe the neural build-up of the intention arise from a lower baseline. 
It was unlikely that participants decided for one of the two response hands 
long before their button press. If an early conscious decision had been made for one of 
the two motor outputs, covert motor preparation for the chosen movement would be 
expected, as seen in the control experiment involving delayed motor intentions, where 
the response hand decision was made in advance and withheld until cued for 
execution. In other words, the response should have been decodable from primary 
motor cortex long before a button was pressed. However, in the main experiment the 
primary motor cortex only contained information much later than frontopolar cortex 
and precuneus, at the time of execution. This pointed strongly towards a late decision 
for one of the two responses, as also indicated by the psychophysical findings. 
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We also ensured that there was no carry-over of information between trials, so 
that the high decoding performance preceding the motor decision could not reflect 
decoding related to the previous trial. First, the classification accuracy increased with 
distance from the previous trial. Second, decoding of the current intention was at 
chance level as the subsequent trial began (Fig. 2-3, time-points after the dashed line), 
suggesting there was no carry-over of information to the next trial. 
Please note that due to the temporal delay of the haemodynamic response, the 
small lead times in SMA/pre-SMA of up to several hundred milliseconds reported in 
previous studies (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; Libet et al., 
1983) are below the temporal resolution of our method. Hence, we could not exclude 
that other regions contained predictive information in the short period immediately 
preceding the conscious intention. It would be difficult to ascertain whether such 
signals occurred before or after the decision in fMRI signals. 
Functional specificity of intention-predictive regions 
By studying free decisions with more than one behavioural option, we showed 
that their specific outcomes could be predicted from two regions in the frontal and 
parietal cortex of the human brain, namely frontopolar and precuneus / posterior 
cingulate. Our findings went substantially further than those of previous studies 
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983) by showing that the earliest predictive 
information was encoded in high-level control regions, and not in SMA or other 
motor-related regions. Although the LRP was also predictive of specific motor 
decisions, its onset was much later, around 1 s before the motor execution (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999). Whereas the LRP originating from the primary motor cortex reflected 
the execution of the decision, predictive neural activity patterns in frontopolar and 
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precuneus / posterior cingulate were likely involved in shaping the upcoming decision. 
We speculate that these intention predictive regions may be potential candidates as 
cortical origins for unconscious changes in skin conductance preceding risky 
decisions (Bechara et al., 1997). 
The additional fMRI study of delayed motor intentions shed further light on 
the respective roles of the early predictive regions. Whereas frontopolar cortex was 
already predictive during the free selection period when the intention was formed, the 
predictive information was only available in the precuneus after the selection was 
made, during the delay and execution period. Taken together, the results from the two 
experiments suggested a functional dissociation between these two regions: the 
frontopolar cortex was the first cortical stage at which the actual decision was made, 
whereas precuneus was involved in the storage of the decision until it reached 
awareness, and eventual execution. This is consistent with previous work suggesting 
that the precuneus is involved in memory, self-referential processing and awareness 
(Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). An intriguing possibility is that the precuneus may be 
involved in binding one’s intentions with the actual motor outcome, which is 
important for establishing a sense of agency over one’s bodily actions (Aarts et al., 
2004; Haggard, 2008; Sirigu et al., 2004; Wegner, 2003). 
Notably, the choice was selected consciously in our control experiment, 
suggesting that similar networks might be involved in conscious and unconscious 
preparation of decisions. Interestingly, in our main experiment generic motor 
preparation appeared to begin in midline motor regions, SMA and pre-SMA, even 
before the decisions became conscious, in agreement with previous findings on the 
cortical midline RP (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). These regions were 
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also most predictive of the time of conscious decision. The double dissociation 
between brain regions with early prediction of the timing but not choice (pre-SMA, 
SMA) and brain regions with late prediction of timing but early prediction of choice 
(frontopolar cortex, precuneus / posterior cingulate) is suggestive. We speculate here 
that as an action decision is made by the frontopolar and precuneus / posterior 
cingulate network, neural activity in the pre-SMA and SMA determine when the 
decided action will be executed, perhaps after a threshold is crossed (Schurger et al., 
2012). Further studies are needed to verify if these different networks indeed decide 
separately what to do and when to do it, and whether such functional segregation 
generalizes to decision scenarios other than spontaneous motor actions. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, two specific regions in the frontal and parietal cortex of the 
human brain had considerable information that predicted the outcome of a motor 
decision the subject had not yet consciously made. This suggests that when the 
subject’s decision reached awareness it had been influenced by unconscious brain 
activity for up to 10 s. This preparatory time period in high-level control regions is 
considerably longer than that reported previously for motor-related brain regions 
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983), and is considerably longer than the 
predictive time shown by the SMA in the current study (Fig. 2-4). Also, in contrast 
with most previous studies (Lau et al., 2004; Libet et al., 1983), the preparatory time 
period reveals that this prior activity is not an unspecific preparation of a response. 
Instead, it specifically encodes how a subject is going to decide. Thus, the SMA is 
presumably not the ultimate cortical decision stage where the conscious intention is 
initiated, as has been previously suggested (Eccles, 1982). Notably, the lead times are 
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too long to be explained by any timing inaccuracies in reporting the onset of 
awareness, which was a major criticism of previous studies (Glynn, 1990; Joordens et 
al., 2002; van de Grind, 2002). The temporal ordering of information suggests a 
tentative causal model of information flow, where the earliest unconscious precursors 
of the motor decision originated in frontopolar cortex, from where they influenced the 
buildup of decision-related information in the precuneus and later in SMA, where it 
remained unconscious for up to a few seconds. This substantially extends previous 
work that has shown that BA10 is involved in storage of conscious action plans 
(Burgess et al., 2001; Haynes et al., 2007; Koechlin et al., 1999) and shifts in strategy 
following negative feedback (Hampton & Doherty, 2007). Thus, a network of high-
level control areas can begin to shape an upcoming decision long before it enters 
awareness. 
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3.1 Abstract 
Recently, we demonstrated using fMRI that the outcome of free decisions can 
be decoded from brain activity several seconds before reaching conscious awareness 
(Soon et al., 2008, Study 1). Activity patterns in anterior frontopolar cortex (BA 10) 
were temporally the first to carry intention-related information and thus a candidate 
region for the unconscious generation of free decisions. In the present study, the 
original paradigm was replicated and multivariate pattern classification was applied to 
functional images of frontopolar cortex, acquired using ultra-high field fMRI at 7 
Tesla. Here, we showed that predictive activity patterns became increasingly stable 
with closer temporal proximity to the conscious decision. Furthermore, detailed 
questionnaires exploring participants’ thoughts before and during the decision 
confirmed that decisions were made spontaneously and participants were unaware of 
the evolution of their decision outcomes. These results give further evidence that FPC 
stands at the top of the prefrontal executive hierarchy in the unconscious generation of 
free decisions. 
 
Key words: free decisions, Libet, multivariate pattern classification, ultra-high 
field fMRI 
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3.2 Introduction 
As humans, we experience the ability to consciously choose our actions as 
well as the time at which we perform them. It has been postulated, however, that this 
subjective experience of freedom may be no more than an illusion (Haggard, 2005; 
Wegner, 2003), and even our goals and motivations can operate outside of our 
consciousness (Custers & Aarts, 2010). In Study 1 (Soon et al., 2008), we found 
empirical support for this view by showing that our conscious decisions may be 
shaped by prior unconscious neural activity, thus casting doubts on the role of 
consciousness in spontaneous voluntary motor acts. We adapted Libet et al.’s (1983) 
intention clock paradigm to fMRI to look for neural precursors of simple motor 
decisions. We were able to detect predictive neural changes up to a few seconds 
before participants consciously decided. This was on a much longer time scale than 
that of a few hundred milliseconds reported in previous EEG studies (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983), and thus afforded a greater level of certainty that the 
decision-related information really occurred before the decision entered conscious 
awareness – our results could not be explained away by potential errors in reporting 
the exact time of conscious decision (Breitmeyer, 1985; Lau et al., 2007; Trevena & 
Miller, 2002; van de Grind, 2002). 
By applying searchlight MVPA techniques to functional brain data from 
discrete time-bins before and after each decision, we were able to extract decision-
related information from fine-grained spatial activation patterns that were not 
detectable using more conventional univariate analyses (Cox & Savoy, 2003; Haxby 
et al., 2001; Haynes & Ress, 2006; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Norman et al., 2006). 
We found a double dissociation between areas predictive of the decision outcome, i.e., 
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‘what’ to do, and areas that contained information about the decision timing, i.e., 
‘when’ to do it. In agreement with previous studies, neural changes could be detected 
in pre-SMA / SMA indicative that a voluntary motor action would be initiated soon 
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). However, these early changes likely 
reflected generic preparatory activity for decision execution, and were not predictive 
of which specific option participants would choose out of two possibilities. In contrast, 
the earliest information predictive of decision outcome was detected in high-level 
brain areas, frontopolar cortex (FPC) and precuneus / posterior cingulate (PCC) rather 
than motor-related regions. Further analyses suggested that these regions were likely 
involved in shaping the decision itself, rather than simply reflecting late stages of 
motor execution. Specifically, Study 1’s results clearly pointed to FPC as a prime 
candidate for the origin of the free decisions. 
Here we replicated the Study 1 using ultra-high field fMRI on a 7-Tesla 
scanner, which allowed us to acquire images with 1×1×1 mm voxels. Specifically, we 
were interested in the role of FPC and thus only brain images from anterior FPC were 
recorded, which allowed a higher spatial resolution of the target region and a better 
temporal resolution (1.5 s TR) of the early components of the decision making 
process. These improvements allowed us to explicitly investigate the temporal 
stability of these early decision-related patterns, which was not addressed in Study 1. 
Furthermore, after the scanning session we assessed our participants’ behaviour and 
their thoughts during the experiment to investigate factors that may have biased the 
decision outcomes. This provided evidence in determining whether early predictive 
activity patterns already reflected conscious aspects of the decision process or whether 
these were related to truly unconscious components of evolving intentions. 
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3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Participants 
Twelve right-handed participants (5 female, average age 24 years, age range 
22–29 years) participated in the fMRI experiment. All participants were students of 
the University of Leipzig, enrolled in various fields of study. All were healthy and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and had no history of neurological disease. 
Suitable participants were selected by means of behavioural pre-tests, conducted 
within the 2 weeks preceding the fMRI session. These pre-tests consisted of 5 blocks 
of the same task as used for the fMRI experiment and ensured that only those 
participants who inherently fulfilled important criteria were selected for the fMRI 
session. First, the frequency with which a participant chose each of the two possible 
outcomes (left button or right button) needed to be balanced, meaning that one option 
should not have been chosen more than twice as often as the other. Second, we 
selected participants that ‘naturally’ performed trials at a moderate pace (i.e., at a 
speed of 15 to 50 seconds per trial). This pace allowed an optimal separation of fMRI 
signals for different trials. These first two criteria were not known to the participants 
such that they had maximal freedom in their decisions, but it was specifically 
emphasised that their decisions should be unbiased and spontaneous. Third, based on 
post-experimental questionnaires it was ensured that participants made spontaneous 
decisions and did not pre-plan them. The behavioural performance from the fMRI 
session was evaluated using the same criteria. We did not pre-select participants 
according to their level of intelligence or any other cognitive capacity. Data from one 
participant (S4) was discarded from all analyses due to relatively unbalanced 
decisions and exceptionally long trial durations. Data from one run of another 
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participant (S12) had to be discarded due to technical problems with recording buttons. 
The study was approved by the local ethics committee at the Max Planck 
Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany. The study was 
carried out in accordance to the Declaration of Helsinki. Informed written consent was 
obtained from each participant before the study. 
3.3.2 Behavioural paradigm 
The behavioural paradigm was essentially similar to Study 1. A stream of 
stimulus screens was presented at a rate of 2 Hz (Fig. 3-1). Each stimulus frame 
displayed a central letter on a dark background. Only consonants were used and were 
presented in a pseudo-randomised order such that the same letter never occurred twice 
within 8 consecutive frames. Participants were instructed to passively view the stream 
of letters, relax, and refrain from thinking about the upcoming task. The index and 
middle fingers of both hands rested on 4 buttons of two joysticks. Participants were 
free to decide, at any time, to press the left or the right button with the corresponding 
index finger. As soon as they were aware of their decision, participants were to note 
the letter presented on the screen. The time at which participants are first aware of 
their decision will hereafter be referred to as the ‘decision time’ in short. Participants 
were instructed to then immediately perform the chosen action without any delay. 
Once a button was pressed with the index finger, a decision-time response screen was 
presented after a variable delay of 1, 1.5, 2 or 2.5 s. The delay variability was 
introduced to facilitate the deconvolution of the BOLD responses for the two button 
presses: 1) free-decision, and 2) decision-time report. This screen contained three 
letters and an asterisk arranged in a square. Participants were then to indicate the letter 
noted at the decision time by pressing the corresponding button on the joystick, the 
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four buttons now corresponding to the position of the letters (or asterisk) on the screen. 
The three letters always corresponded to the three letters shown immediately prior to 
and including the button press (0, −0.5 s and −1.0 s relative to the button press). Their 
positions were also randomized. If participants were unable to recall the letter 
presented at the time of the button press, or if the relevant letter was not displayed, 
they were told to select the asterisk. Using a letter stream as a timing device allowed 
us to detect whether decisions were planned ahead of time (see Study 1, Soon et al., 
2008). Upon completion of the trial, the stream of stimuli resumed. Participants again 
relaxed and passively viewed the stream of stimuli until the next decision was 
spontaneously made. Note that participants were only instructed to relax and not to 
pre-plan their decisions at any time; the pacing and the ratio of left and right decisions 
were deliberately left to spontaneity in order to avoid any artificial restrictions of the 
free decision process. As described above, pre-tests were used to select only those 
participants for the fMRI session who inherently showed optimal behavioural 
performance. 
After the scanning session, participants completed a questionnaire about their 
subjective experiences with the experiment. They were asked to report their thoughts 
and behaviour during the experiment, even if these had contradicted the task 
instructions. Participants were asked to rate on a five-point scale: I) how often they 
made a decision earlier during the trial but waited before executing the button press (0 
= never, to 4 = always); II) their spontaneity throughout the experiment (0 = not 
spontaneous at all, to 4 = very spontaneous); III) how often they explicitly thought 
about the timing of their decisions (0 = never, to 4 = always). Additionally, they had 
to describe IV) the content of their thoughts between trials, and V) if they noticed any 
changes in their performance during the experiment. 
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Fig. 3-1. Measuring the onset time of free conscious motor intentions. 
Participants were presented with a stream of constantly changing white letters 
on dark background. The screen was refreshed every 500 ms. The task was to 
freely and spontaneously decide to press a response button with the left or the 
right index finger (illustrated by upper circles; decision for left button in 
example illustrated by filled circle) whenever they felt the urge to do so. They 
were instructed to note the letter displayed on the screen when they became 
aware of their intention and to immediately perform the button press (the letter 
H in the example; red circles are for illustration and were not presented). 
Following the button press, a response screen was presented. Three letters and 
an asterisk were presented in the four corners of the screen, the letters being 
those shown during and immediately prior to the button press. Participants 
indicated the letter that was visible at the time of the decision by pressing the 
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button corresponding to its position on screen (recalled letter H, indicated by 
upper right button in example). If they could not remember the letter or if the 
relevant letter was not present, they indicated this with the asterisk. After the 
response was given, the next trial started and participants were instructed to 
return to a relaxed state before making a new decision. The general paradigm 
was taken from Study 1 (Soon et al., 2008). 
3.3.3 Functional imaging and preprocessing 
Functional imaging data was acquired using a 7-Tesla whole- body MR 
scanner (MAGNETOM 7T; Siemens, Germany) with an 8 channel array head coil 
(RAPID Biomedical, Rimpar, Germany). A gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) 
sequence was used for functional imaging (TR = 1500 ms, TE = 23 ms, flip angle = 
90°, matrix size 64×64, in-plane resolution 1×1 mm). 21–28 slices were acquired (1 
mm thickness, no gap), depending on the SAR limit of individual participants, and 
covered the most anterior part of prefrontal cortex. In order to minimise signal 
dropout due to the frontal sinuses, the slices were tilted away from the coronal 
orientation by an angle of 30.2° to the transverse plane (due to the anatomy of 
individual participants and their position in the scanner, the angle was 37.6° in two 
cases and 36.0° in one case). Particularly for ultra-high field strength, signal dropout 
and distortions in frontopolar cortex can be substantial. This setup was found to 
maximally reduce signal distortions and dropouts for the present study because it 
allowed us to use a small field of view (FOV), and thus a short echo train length, in 
order to cover most of anterior prefrontal cortex with maximal exclusion of the air-
filled cavities compared to axial slices (Fig. 3-2). However, using this setup no region 
beyond frontopolar cortex could be covered. 
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Fig. 3-2. Illustration of EPI image, slice positioning and decoding 
approach. A) Example of one slice of one participant’s EPI image. B) 
Structural T1 image from the same participant displaying the positioning of the 
example slice (dotted line) and slice coverage (blue box). For each participant, 
21–25 coronal slices (1×1×1 mm, without gap) were positioned such that the 
most anterior part of frontopolar cortex was covered. Due to the optimized 
slice positioning, which allowed the use of a small field of view (FOV) and a 
short echo train length, a relatively small part of the air-filled cavities was 
included. This improved the quality of the EPIs and reduced signal dropouts 
and distortions. C) The parameter estimates from the FIR model were used for 
multivariate pattern classification. A moving ‘searchlight’ algorithm was 
implemented using a radius of 3 voxels in order to decode the outcome of the 
upcoming decision from each position in frontopolar cortex. 
Data was acquired for 10 functional runs, each lasting 5 minutes (200 volumes 
per run). The first two volumes of each run were discarded by default to allow for 
magnetic saturation effects. Additionally, a structural T1-weighted image was 
acquired for each participant for co-registration (176 transverse slices; TR = 3840 ms, 
TE = 268 ms; voxel resolution 1×1×1 mm). During the scanning sessions, stimuli 
were presented via a projector with a resolution of 1024×768 pixels (refresh rate of 60 
Hz) that projected from behind the head-end of the scanner onto a screen. Participants 
laid supine in the scanner and viewed the projection via a mirror. Responses were 
recorded using a set of two custom-engineered, deconstructed Nintendo Wii joysticks, 
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each with two buttons operated with the index and middle fingers of either hand. 
The first stage of data processing involved motion correction to the first image 
of the first run using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). No additional 
normalization or smoothing was performed at that stage in order to maximize the 
sensitivity for information encoded in the fine-grained voxel patterns (Haynes & Rees, 
2005, 2006; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Soon et al., 2008). 
3.3.4 General linear model 
As in Study 1, a finite impulse response (FIR) predictor was used to model 
fMRI responses, as it was not known whether the profile of the fMRI time course 
would adhere to the generic haemodynamic stimulus-response function in this 
situation. This procedure also allowed time-resolved decoding to be implemented 
(Bode & Haynes, 2009; Soon et al., 2008). Left-button trials and right-button trials 
were modelled as two separate conditions, each with 20 FIR regressors. Each 
regressor modelled a time-bin of 1.5 s (1 TR), covering a 30-second time period 
around each trial. The 10th time-bin was defined as that in which a decision was made. 
The first 10 regressors therefore modelled the 15 seconds preceding (and including) 
each decision, the last 10 covered the 15 seconds following the decision. Invalid trials 
(in which participants were unable to recall a letter) were modelled separately, again 
using 20 FIR predictors and assigning the 10th predictor as that in which the button 
was pressed. These trials were excluded from the pattern classification analyses. To 
minimise unaccounted-for variance in the fMRI data, the second button-presses with 
which participants indicated the letter present at the decision time were modelled as 
covariates. Left-handed and right-handed button presses were modelled separately, 
and convolved with a standard haemodynamic response function (HRF). 
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3.3.5 Multivariate pattern analyses 
The data was analysed with searchlight-based multi-voxel pattern analyses 
(MVPA), as described in Chapter 1. The analyses sought to identify regions within 
FPC that allowed participants’ decisions for left and right to be decoded from fine-
grained patterns of activity as measured by the BOLD signal preceding the 
participants’ conscious awareness of their decisions, identical to Study 1. The choice-
predictive information encoded within a spherical cluster of voxels at each position in 
the brain could be estimated without making any a-priori assumptions as to the exact 
location (voxel) of the information (Fig. 3-2C). 
Decoding the content of motor decisions 
As a direct replication of Study 1, the searchlight radius was kept at r = 3 
voxels. Note that in the original study the voxel size was 3×3×3 mm while the 
reduction of voxel size in the present study to 1×1×1 mm yielded a searchlight 27 
times smaller. Nevertheless, information decoding was based on the same number of 
dimensions (voxels) in both cases. The total number of voxels in the whole search 
volume in anterior PFC was comparable to that in a whole-brain data set with the 
standard 3×3×3 mm voxel resolution acquired on a 3T scanner.  
For each spherical volume searchlight of N voxels, the parameter estimates for 
all 20 time-bins were extracted from each run, separately from left-decision and right-
decision trials. These were transformed into two N-dimensional pattern vectors (one 
corresponding to left-decision trials, the other to right-decision trials) for each of the 
20 time-bins, representing the spatial activation patterns for both decisions from 15 s 
before to 15 s after the conscious decision. An independent classification analysis was 
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performed at each time bin to assess how much discriminative intention-related 
information was contained in the patterns of that time period. Pattern vectors from 
nine of the ten runs (eight of the nine runs for the participant with one excluded run) 
were first assigned to a ‘training data set’. This set was used to train a linear support 
vector machine (SVM) pattern classifier (LIBSVM implementation, 
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm) to discriminate between patterns 
corresponding to the two different decision outcomes (or intentional states), using a 
fixed regularization parameter C=1. The classifier estimated a decision boundary 
separating the two classes of patterns in N-dimensional space. The amount of 
intention-related information contained in these patterns was then assessed by using 
the decision boundary to classify the vectors in the independent ‘test data set’ taken 
from the remaining run. Chance level for correct prediction of whether each vector 
corresponded to a left-or right-button decision was 50%. This procedure was repeated 
10 times, each time using a different run as the independent test data set, resulting in a 
10-fold cross-validation. The pattern classification results were averaged across 
repetitions and assigned to the central voxel of the searchlight cluster as its decoding 
accuracy. 
The entire procedure was repeated by assigning in turn every voxel in the 
brain volume as the central voxel of the searchlight cluster, yielding a 3D map of 
decoding accuracies throughout the imaged volume. Each map represented the 
amount of intention-related information encoded in the local neural neighbourhood at 
every location in the brain of a participant, at each time-bin before and after the 
spontaneous decision. Combining accuracy maps across all 20 time-bins revealed the 
spatio-temporal dynamics of intention-related information flowing across the brain. 
Study 2: Temporal Stability of Neural Patterns Involved in Intention Formation 69 
 
 
 In the next step, the participants’ individual decoding accuracy maps were 
normalized to MNI-space for group-level analyses. For this, the functional images 
were first co-registered to the individual high-resolution T1-weighted structural 
whole-brain image acquired during the same scanning session. The T1-weighted 
image was normalized to the MNI T1-template image as implemented in SPM2. The 
normalization parameters were then applied to the decoding accuracy maps. These 
were further smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 3 mm FWHM. Voxels that were not 
shared by all participants were masked out. For each time-bin, group level analyses 
were performed across participants. The decoding accuracy maps from the time-bins 
preceding the decision (time-bins 1–10) were analysed, yielding a statistical 
parametric map of voxel clusters (using a 5-voxel cluster size threshold) that 
displayed decoding accuracies greater than chance level (50% for two decisions) 
during the 15 seconds preceding (and up to) the conscious decision time (using a 
threshold of p<.05, FDR-corrected). It was therefore possible to track changes in the 
amount of information encoded in different regions over time, and in particular, to 
search for a build-up of intention-related information prior to participants’ conscious 
awareness of their own intentions, as observed by Soon et al. (2008). 
Temporal pattern stability analysis 
The goal of this analysis was to investigate the spatio-temporal profile 
(Mourão-Miranda et al., 2007) of the time-bins that allowed the prediction of free 
decisions before they reach conscious awareness. Individual data from the searchlight 
yielding the highest decoding accuracy across participants (see Results and Fig. 3-3A) 
preceding the decision was analysed across time-bins for each participant. This 
coordinate, which was established from MNI-normalized group-level statistical maps, 
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was transformed back into the original image space of individual participants. A 
spherical cluster with radius of three voxels was again constructed around this 
position for each participant, and the spatial activation patterns for the two types of 
decisions were extracted and transformed into pattern vectors, separately for each run. 
The pattern vectors from single time-bins were then combined for each 
decision by I) simply averaging vectors in steps of (i) two, (ii) three or (iii) four time-
bins; or by II) concatenating vectors in the same steps as I. The multivariate pattern 
classification analysis was run again on these new vectors, exactly as described before; 
the difference was that there were a smaller number of time steps per analysis. If 
averaging across earlier time-bins did not reduce the decoding accuracy, this would 
mean the spatial activation patterns displayed a consistently high temporal stability in 
those time-bins. Finally, correlation analyses were also conducted between the pattern 
vectors of adjacent time-bins (separately for each participant and each condition) in 
order to assess the temporal stability of these patterns in more detail. 
Since the results did not differ for left and right decisions, they were combined. 
Please note that all these subsequent analyses only aimed to specify the role of the 
best searchlight cluster and not to select voxels for further dependent statistical 
analyses, which would have been circular (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009). Also note that 
the chosen cluster was the best decoding cluster averaged across participants. This 
cluster therefore did not necessarily represent the optimal decoding cluster in 
individual participants. Analysing the optimal clusters in individual participants, 
however, would have carried the risk of arbitrariness and was therefore strictly 
avoided. 
Study 2: Temporal Stability of Neural Patterns Involved in Intention Formation 71 
 
 
Univariate control analysis 
The parameter estimates obtained from a GLM, based on normalised and 
smoothed (3 mm FWHM) data, were used in a conventional mass-univariate analysis. 
Again, an FIR predictor was used to model fMRI responses (identical to the GLM 
analysis described above) and group-level analyses were performed across 
participants for each time-bin separately. The purpose of this analysis was to 
investigate whether any voxels at any time-bin showed significant differences in 
activation between the left-decision and right-decision trials. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Behavioural results 
On average, participants chose the left button on 51% of all trials, and the right 
button 49%. There were only very few trials in which participants could not recall the 
letter present when their decision was made (average 1% of all trials). In nearly all 
trials, participants indicated that the decision reached conscious awareness during the 
presentation of the same letter or one letter before they pressed the button (see Table 
3-1 for details). Any participant who showed highly unbalanced decisions (i.e., one 
option was chosen more than twice as often as the other), or had exceptionally short 
or long trial durations (i.e., on average <15 s or >50 s) were excluded from further 
analyses. One participant (S4) was thus excluded. The average time lapsed between 
consecutive trials was 29.7 s (SD = 9.29); an average of 11 trials was performed per 5 
min run. 
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Table 3-1. Behavioural results 
Participant Left 
 
 
Right 
 
 
Mean trial 
Duration 
(SD) s 
Letter 
indicated 
(mean) 
‘*’  
indicated  
S1 56% 44% 20.7 (7.8) -0.19 1% 
S2 59% 41% 23.2 (5.5) -0.17 0% 
S3 46% 54% 24.0 (6.3) -0.13 1% 
S4 39% 61% 58.4(20.4) -0.11 7% 
S5 50% 50% 46.4 (8.2) -0.17 0% 
S6 56% 44% 42.4 (8.0) -0.09 0% 
S7 50% 50% 26.8 (6.2) -0.13 0% 
S8 43% 57% 28.1 (7.1) -0.12 0% 
S9 50% 50% 36.2(14.7) -0.07 4% 
S10 55% 45% 24.4 (8.9) -0.13 2% 
S11 45% 55% 36.6(15.0) -0.93 5% 
S12 52% 48% 18.0 (4.0) -1.36 2% 
Note. ‘Letter indicated’ refers to the number of letters between the time of 
conscious decision and button press (500 ms duration per letter). On average, 
the intention reached conscious awareness during the same time-bin (0) or one 
time-bin earlier (-1) relative to the button press. ‘*’ was chosen when 
participants could not remember the letter presented at the point of conscious 
decision, or when the letter was not displayed (i.e., decision was >1s before 
button press. 
In the post-experimental interviews participants indicated that they were able 
to relax and make spontaneous decisions (Table 3-2). The button press was generally 
executed with minimal delay after they became aware of their intentions (M = 0.9; SD 
= 0.5), as instructed. They indicated having been very spontaneous (M = 3.3; SD = 
0.65) and they did not pay much attention to the timing (M = 1.0; SD = 0.9). Most 
participants reported that they did not have specific thoughts they could remember. 
Some reported having thought about (or mentally read) the letters, some reported 
having occasionally thought about daily activities but none reported having thought 
about the decisions. Most participants reported that they became more relaxed through 
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the experiment and that they either became more spontaneous or that there was no 
change in spontaneity. This was not surprising given that participants were highly 
familiar with the task, having completed 10 runs of prior training, and were able to 
perform the task effortlessly. 
 
Table 3-2. Individual post-experimental interview results 
Participant Qn. I Qn. II Qn. III Qn. IV Qn. V 
S1 2 4 2 the day, girlfriend, relaxing nothing 
S2 1 4 1 letters, nothing more relaxed 
S3 1 3 3 nothing more relaxed 
S4 excluded – – – – 
S5 1 3 1 nothing nothing 
S6 1 3 0 nothing nothing 
S7 1 3 0 nothing decisions slightly faster 
S8 1 3 1 letters more relaxed, spontaneous 
S9 0 4 1 letters, uni, holidays forgot letters few trials 
S10 1 2 1 letters nothing 
S11 0 3 0 nothing decisions slighty slower 
S12 1 4 1 nothing nothing 
Mean 0.9 3.3 1.0   
SD 0.5 0.6 0.9   
Note. One participant (S4) was excluded from all analyses because of 
behavioural criteria. Actual questions: 
I) “How often did you make a decision earlier during the trial but waited with 
the button press?” (0 = never; 4 = always);  
II) “How would you rate your spontaneity throughout the experiment?” (0 = 
not spontaneous at all; 4 = very spontaneous);  
III)  “How often did you explicitly think about the timing of your decisions?” (0 
= never; 4 = always);  
IV) “What did you think about during the experiment, as far as you can 
remember?” (open-ended);  
V) “Did you notice any changes in your behaviour during the experiment? If 
yes, what changed?” (open-ended) 
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Additional analyses were performed to check whether participants made 
random choices on each trial or followed specific patterns. We first correlated the 
sequences of decisions from each run of each participant with the sequence of 
decisions in the following run, in order to control for the possibility that participants 
might have simply repeated fixed sequences of decisions over the experiment. None 
of these correlations were significant for any of the participants (all tests p>.05; 
average correlation r = −0.11; range −0.27 to 0.07). For each participant and within 
each functional run, we further analysed whether the sequences of left and right 
decisions violated the assumption of a random order (runs test as implemented in 
MATLAB, Math-Works Inc., corrected for multiple tests). The results showed that out 
of all 110 functional runs from all 11 participants, violations of the randomness 
assumption could only be found in one single run (p=.004; all others p>.05), 
providing additional evidence that behaviour was spontaneous. (However, note that 
due to the nature of our task, there were very few successive trials per functional run, 
thus potentially limiting the informative value of this test.) These results indicated that 
participants performed correctly and that preplanning or other unaccounted-for 
conscious cognitive activity could not account for the predictive information detected 
before the conscious decision. 
3.4.2 Functional imaging results 
Searchlight-based MVPA was used to search for brain regions encoding 
participants’ decision outcomes. We identified a cluster in FPC from which 
participants’ decisions could be decoded before their intentions became conscious (i.e., 
time-bin 10, Fig. 3-3), with statistically significant decoding accuracies of up to 57% 
(SE = 1.69; p<.05, FDR-corrected) just before the decision was made (time-bin 9; see 
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Fig. 3-3). This region was located in left frontopolar cortex (MNI coordinates −23 59 
−9; see Fig. 3-4 for individual searchlight clusters). The earliest time at which 
decoding was possible was ~7.5 seconds (time-bin 4) before the decision was reported 
to be consciously made. Taking into account the temporal delay of the BOLD signal 
(which is in the order of a few seconds), it was possible that these signals reflected 
processes up to 10 seconds before the actual decision. 
 
Fig. 3-3. Decoding of upcoming motor decisions from frontopolar cortex. 
A) The figure displays a region in left frontopolar cortex [-23 59 -9] from 
which decoding was significantly above chance (50%; p<.05, FDR corrected; 
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5-voxel cluster-size threshold). FPC only showed significant decoding 
accuracies in the time-bins preceding the decision. B) The graph displays the 
average time-course of decoding accuracies, taken from the central voxel of 
the searchlight cluster that showed the highest decoding accuracy. Error bars 
represent standard errors. The time-bin of the conscious intention is indicated 
by the red bar and is labelled as time 0. Time-bins preceding the conscious 
awareness of the intention are labelled as negative numbers (units = seconds, 
relative to decision); time-bins following the decision are therefore positive. 
One time- bin corresponds to 1.5 s. Coordinates displayed are MNI coordinates. 
 
Fig. 3-4. Individual searchlight clusters. Displayed are the spherical voxel 
clusters (with radius r = 3 voxels) in frontopolar cortex of all participants that 
yielded the highest decoding accuracy in the time-bin directly preceding the 
decision (−1.5 s). Voxels responding preferentially to one decision are colour-
coded (magenta for left, aqua for right; sup = superior, ant = anterior, R = 
right). Grey transparent voxels did not show decision preference or were not 
located in grey matter. Colours are scaled for better visualization. Informative 
patterns were different for each participant. 
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Using a searchlight radius of 4 voxels led to decreased decoding accuracies 
and p-values for the same region. When the radius was further increased, no 
significant results could be achieved, possibly due to the increased dimensionality. In 
a control analysis the accuracy maps from the time-bins after the decision was made 
(time-bins 11–20) were contrasted against chance level. No clusters could be found in 
FPC encoding any information above chance level during this period. The same held 
true if separate time-bins around the time of the motor response were considered, 
matching the findings from Study 1 that FPC only encoded the intentions before 
participants were aware of making a decision. 
 
Fig. 3-5. Univariate BOLD signal changes. Average BOLD parameter 
estimates for left- and right-button decisions in central voxel of searchlight 
with highest decoding accuracy prior to the conscious decision. For both 
conditions, the signal increased only after the decision (red bar), and returned 
to baseline within ten seconds. Significant differences between left and right 
decisions were not found here. Similarly, no region within the imaged volume 
displayed such a difference, even when a liberal threshold of p<.001 
(uncorrected) was used. Time-bins preceding the conscious awareness of the 
intention are labelled as negative (units = seconds, relative to decision). One 
time-bin corresponds to 1.5 s. Coordinates are given as MNI coordinates. 
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The information was, as in the original study, only encoded in fine-grained 
activation patterns rather than in the average signal. Additional univariate analyses 
confirmed that there was no significant difference between left and right decisions at 
any time in individual voxels, even when a liberal threshold of p<.001 (uncorrected) 
was applied. This held true for the whole frontopolar region as well as for the region 
from which decoding was possible. The average BOLD signal did not increase at all 
until after the decision was made (Fig. 3-5). 
Temporal pattern stability analysis results 
The subsequent decoding analysis using the best searchlight cluster across all 
participants showed that averaging across adjacent time-bins led to lower decoding 
accuracies, the more time-bins that were combined (Fig. 3-6). In contrast, 
concatenating time-bins, which effectively combined spatial and temporal information 
before the decision, still predicted the decision outcome with high accuracy (Fig. 3-6). 
Concatenating was superior to averaging by trend, suggesting that, spatial patterns 
were not uniform throughout the period leading up to a decision, but carried more 
decision-related information with increasing temporal proximity to the decision. 
Nevertheless, subsequent analyses showed significant correlation of spatial patterns 
from consecutive time-bins. Moreover, pattern similarity increased with temporal 
proximity to the decision (peak r = .44, p<.05; Fig. 3-7). After the time-bin of the 
decision, the correlations dropped again to a stable level. This auto-correlation curve 
closely mimicked the time-course of decoding accuracies (Fig. 3-7). Thus, activity 
patterns became more similar and more informative the closer the decision was to 
reaching awareness. After the decision was made, some pattern stability was sustained 
but the patterns no longer carried information about the decision. 
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Fig. 3-6. Temporal pattern stability. Temporal-spatial decoding analysis. 
The spatial activation patterns from the searchlight cluster centered on −23 59 
−9 (MNI), which showed the highest predictive accuracy, was extracted from 
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individual participants’ data. The original patterns from the time-bins were 
combined by concatenating (white) or averaging (grey) the respective pattern 
vectors in steps of either (i) two, (ii) three, or (iii) four time-bins. The reference 
time-bin for vector concatenation was the time-point of the decision (time 0 s). 
The resulting pattern vectors additionally represented temporal information for 
the best searchlight cluster and were used for multivariate decoding. Spatio-
temporal information was found to be highest directly preceding the decision 
and was still present when four time bins were concatenated. Concatenating 
was superior to averaging by trend. 
 
Fig. 3-7. Correlation analysis for spatial activation patterns. Displayed is 
the decoding accuracy across time from the best cluster (empty gray triangles) 
as well as the correlation of each time-bin with its preceding time-bin (filled 
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yellow triangles) as a measure of pattern similarity (averaged across patterns 
for left and right decisions). Up to the time of the decision (time 0 s) the 
decoding accuracy and pattern similarity increased in a similar fashion. After 
the decision, the pattern similarity dropped slightly and patterns did not predict 
the decision outcome anymore. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
This study aimed to assess whether local spatial activity patterns in FPC, 
which was previously found to encode unconscious intentions in Study 1, would 
display temporal stability over time. Using ultra-high field fMRI at 7T, allowing a 
voxel resolution of 1×1×1 mm, we could replicate the findings of the first study. We 
also demonstrated that activity patterns preceding the time-point of the conscious 
decision became increasingly similar with closer temporal proximity to the decision. 
Our behavioural data and questionnaire results provided further support that the 
decisions were unlikely to have been biased by conscious processes. Thus, early 
predictive activity patterns were attributable to unconscious components of evolving 
intentions. 
Comparable to Study 1, the participants’ decisions could be read out 
approximately seven seconds before they became conscious. Given the 
haemodynamic delay, it was likely that this reflected neural processes that occurred 
even earlier by a few seconds. The site of information encoding was found to be left 
frontopolar cortex, also referred to as the rostral lateral prefrontal cortex or the 
anterior prefrontal cortex, and approximately the most anterior part of Brodmann area 
10 (Brodmann, 1909; Ongur et al., 2003; Ramnani & Owen, 2004). The same region 
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was identified in Study 1 but in the opposite hemisphere. In this second study, we 
optimized the slice positioning to minimize distortion effects and signal dropouts, 
which are a common problem due to the proximity to frontal sinuses, especially at 
higher field strength. Since the analysis only included voxels that were present in all 
participants, residual dropout in individual participants could have led to the exclusion 
of more informative voxels. Hence, our results might underestimate the extent of the 
decision-related region. 
No information about the participants’ decisions was found after the decision 
was made, which is also in line with our original findings in Study 1 that after the 
time of the decision, information was only encoded in primary motor cortex and pre-
motor cortex. These areas were not covered in the present study. Due to the optimized 
slice positioning in this second study, the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, which 
additionally encoded early decision-related signals in Study 1, was also not covered. 
As demonstrated before, the procedure used in both studies ensured that decoding 
could not be explained by activity related to the previous trial. Again, a FIR model 
was used, designed to separate effects of the current trial from the previous and the 
following trial. This method is highly efficient as long as both types of responses are 
roughly equally frequent, as here. Importantly, participants self-paced their decisions, 
ensuring that the intervals between trials were variable, which makes the estimation of 
the FIR model even more robust to carry-over effects. Second, the time delay between 
the onset of predictive information in frontopolar cortex and the end of the previous 
trial was on average ~15 seconds, and thus far beyond the relaxation time of the 
haemodynamic response. The average trial duration (29.7 s) in the present study was 
even longer than in Study 1 (21.6 s), thus making it even more unlikely that spill-over 
effects from the previous trials might have occurred. For the earliest time-points in a 
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trial we found no predictive information – contrary to what would have been expected 
if successful decoding was due to carry-over effects from the previous trial. However, 
as the trial progressed, approaching the decision time predictive information emerged. 
Third, the temporal resolution was also improved (1.5 s per time-bin compared to 2 s 
per time-bin in the original study), further validating the original findings. Although 
we do not believe and do not claim that our participants produced perfectly random 
sequences, our behavioural results suggest that participants made spontaneous 
decisions. This was probably because we did not ask participants to balance their 
decisions, and there were no external constraints for preferring one option over 
another in any given trial. 
Interestingly, we observed an increase in similarity between patterns with 
increasing temporal proximity to the conscious decision. This increase in correlation 
was mirrored by the increase in information content about the decision outcome. Thus, 
one possible explanation for this finding is that during the unconscious phase of 
intention-formation, the patterns slowly ‘evolved’ towards the final conscious 
decision, comparable to an ‘evidence accumulation’ process postulated for fast, 
stimulus-driven decisions (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). This hypothesis states that once a 
threshold is crossed (a certain pattern is stable enough), a conscious decision is made 
and activation patterns lose their predictive power afterwards. The remaining (but 
reduced) pattern stability might be explained by the dependence of sequentially 
acquired brain scans. Although there was some tendency for patterns to remain stable 
for a few seconds after the decision, there was no decodable information at these post-
decision time periods. Similarly, patterns during the initial phase of the following trial 
were not informative. It was only later, closer to the next decision in the next trial, that 
we again observed a slow increase of pattern similarity and information encoding. 
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This again spoke against carry-over effects from the previous trial. Our detailed 
behavioural analysis confirmed that participants did not systematically and 
consciously prepare their decisions ahead of time. They acted as instructed and were 
spontaneous. Similarly, in Study 1 we did not observe any encoding of the chosen 
movement in motor cortex before the decision; however, this could be expected when 
participants pre-plan a motor response (Bode & Haynes, 2009). Here this analysis was 
not possible due to the restriction of coverage to PFC which was necessary to achieve 
a higher spatial resolution. We thus conclude that the early informative spatial 
activation patterns in frontopolar cortex were related to unconscious components of 
the intention. This again supported the hypothesis of a slow unconscious drift towards 
a ‘prototypical’ pattern in FPC, which was related to the conscious decision.  
It might be surprising that decision-related information is encoded in the brain 
several seconds before the decision becomes conscious, given that the task was rather 
simple. One possibility is that random activity directly preceding the decision might 
have biased the decision outcome, as suggested for short time periods (Smith & 
Ratcliff, 2004). This, however, was less likely for such long periods as observed here. 
Our study might have facilitated the detection of very early information by 
encouraging participants to relax and refrain from decision-related thoughts as well as 
by instructing participants to be as spontaneous as possible in making and executing 
their decisions. By doing so, unlike most other studies, our experiment was uniquely 
suited to investigate the early evolution of intentions. Even though there was credible 
evidence that our participants’ behaviour was spontaneous, the possibility remains that 
there may be some hidden regularities in their responses, which might only become 
detectable in longer behavioural sequences than produced here. Such biases, even 
though outside participants’ awareness, could potentially contribute to the build-up of 
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early brain activation patterns. It is important to note that any temporal autocorrelation 
in the signals could cause a correlation between choices in successive trials, even 
without a conscious, deliberative link. Such autocorrelation might be considered a 
very basic form of memory, but our conclusion that choices could be predicted before 
awareness would remain unchanged, as the participants themselves were not aware of 
following such response regularities. 
Please note that our results could not be taken as direct evidence for a causal 
relationship between the activation in frontopolar cortex and the decision because 
fMRI measures neural decision-related processes only indirectly and prediction 
accuracy was far from perfect. 
The present study supported the hypothesis that prefrontal cortex is a core 
region for free decisions. Presently, it is believed that the anterior prefrontal cortex 
lies at the top of a hierarchically organized prefrontal functional architecture. 
Prefrontal cortex represents sensory input information in its most abstract form and 
guides cognitive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001). It maintains the abstract 
representation of a desired act, together with context-relevant information such as 
environmental contexts, task-rules, motivation and potential outcomes (Bode & 
Haynes, 2009; Bunge, 2004; Bunge & Wallis, 2007; Sakai, 2008). The motor plan for 
the execution of this act is prepared in premotor areas, and broken down into 
coordinated recruitment of single motor units in primary motor cortex (Passingham, 
1995). Medial prefrontal cortex might additionally contribute to action planning by 
processing self-related information (Amodio & Frith, 2006), in this case, one’s 
intentions. It has also been found to encode freely chosen decisions during a delay 
before execution (Haynes et al., 2007). 
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Of the different regions in prefrontal cortex, however, evidence from 
cytoarchitectural studies suggests that frontopolar cortex has the necessary 
architecture to support the highest level of processing within prefrontal cortex. First, it 
has the greatest number of dentritic spines per cell, and overall spine density is higher 
than for all other areas of prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, it is the only supramodal 
area that is connected solely with other supramodal areas, has less laminar 
differentiation compared to other prefrontal areas, and its connections within PFC 
point towards a hierarchically high level of processing (Badre & D’Esposito, 2009; 
Jacobs et al., 2001; Semendeferi et al., 2001). Given these properties, frontopolar 
cortex is an optimal candidate for the representation of the most abstract contents 
(Badre & D’Esposito, 2009). Current hypotheses about the function of this region are 
based mainly on functional imaging studies, as this region is markedly smaller and 
difficult to access in primate electrophysiology. Presently, the cognitive processes in 
which frontopolar cortex has been implicated include: processing of internal states 
(Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000), modulation of episodic memory retrieval (Herron et al., 
2004; LePage et al., 2000), prospective memory (Burgess et al., 2001), relational 
reasoning (Christoff et al., 2001; Kroger et al., 2002), the integration of cognitive 
processes (Ramnani & Owen, 2004) and cognitive branching (Koechlin & Hyafil, 
2007). Frontopolar cortex has also been suggested to control long-term plans and to 
generate new cognitive sequences (Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007). This is supported by 
recent findings showing that frontopolar cortex also tracks the advantage of 
alternative action plans and might initiate switching (Boorman et al., 2009). Burgess 
et al. (2007) proposed that the type of processing in frontopolar cortex is determined 
by the context, allowing either stimulus-oriented (i.e., pertaining to the external 
environment) or stimulus-independent (i.e., pertaining to the internally generated 
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representations) processing to occur. These theories are in line with a role of 
frontopolar cortex in the generation of free decision as demonstrated by both Studies 1 
and 2. 
One possibility is that neurons in frontopolar cortex could be tuned to different 
decision outcomes, while having the capacity to be flexibly re-coded depending on 
task demands as previously suggested for prefrontal cortex (Duncan, 2001; Sigala et 
al., 2008). This mechanism would also allow different types of intentions to be 
encoded without the need for hardwiring of single neurons to any single intention. 
Most abstract intentions are closely linked to some motor action anyway and might 
therefore be represented in a similar manner. Additionally, it has been proposed that 
evolutionarily newer functions, such as cultural inventions, could make use of already 
existing neural structures evolved for more basic but similar functions (Dehaene & 
Cohen, 2007). Study 3 will address this question by investigating the encoding of 
more abstract intentions, such as performing mathematical calculations, and the 
functional organization of the architecture that gives rise to them. 
Conclusion 
In summary, we could replicate the findings of Study 1 that motor intentions 
were encoded in frontopolar cortex up to seven seconds before participants were 
aware of their decisions. Using ultra-high field fMRI on a 7 Tesla scanner, we showed 
that these patterns became more stable with increasing temporal proximity to the 
conscious decision. These findings support the conclusion that frontopolar cortex is 
part of a network of brain regions that shape conscious decisions long before they 
reach conscious awareness. This once again questions the specific role of the 
conscious mind in voluntary decisions.  
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4.1 Abstract 
Unconscious neural activity has been repeatedly shown to precede and 
potentially even influence subsequent free decisions. However, to date such findings 
have been mostly restricted to simple motor choices, and despite considerable debate 
there is no evidence that the outcome of more complex free decisions can be predicted 
from prior brain signals. Here, we showed that the outcome of a free abstract decision 
to either add or subtract numbers could already be decoded from neural activity in 
medial prefrontal and parietal cortex four seconds before the participants reported to 
be consciously making their choice. These choice-predictive signals co-occurred with 
the so-called default mode brain activity pattern that was still dominant at the time 
when the choice-predictive signals occurred. Our results suggest that unconscious 
preparation of free choices is not restricted to motor preparation. Instead, decisions at 
multiple scales of abstraction evolve from the dynamics of preceding brain activity. 
 
Key words: free decisions, Libet, multivariate pattern classification, self-paced 
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4.2 Introduction 
The subjective experience that our voluntary actions are initiated in the 
conscious mind has been challenged by the finding that the human brain may already 
start shaping spontaneous decisions even before they enter into conscious awareness 
(Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008, Study 1). Specifically, the human brain can start 
preparing spontaneous movements up to several seconds before a person believes 
themselves to be consciously making a decision to move (Bode et al., 2011; Haggard 
& Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008). 
To date, such early choice-predictive signals have only been investigated for 
simple movement decisions (Bode et al., 2011; Fried et al., 2011; Haggard & Eimer, 
1999; Libet et al., 1983; Schurger et al., 2012; Soon et al., 2008). However, there are 
several reasons to assess whether preparatory processes also occur for higher-level, 
more abstract types of decisions. First, the relevance of motor decisions for 
understanding the neural formation and preparation of intentions has been heavily 
debated (Roskies, 2010; Smith, 2011), mainly because of their reduced complexity 
(Breitmeyer, 1985; Jung, 1985) and the limited levels of awareness in motor control 
(Danto, 1985; Doty, 1985). Second, previous studies on predictive signals for motor 
choices have revealed early information in prefrontal and parietal brain regions. These 
regions are not generally considered ‘motor’, but they have been sporadically 
observed in motor preparation (Boyd et al., 2009; Groll-Knapp et al., 1977). This 
invites the question of whether these regions provide only unconscious preparation of 
motor intentions or a common, task-independent network for preparing multiple types 
of decisions before awareness. 
Study 3: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Abstract Intentions 92 
 
As such, we adapted Libet's intention clock paradigm to a context involving 
endogenous selection between two options that required more complex cognitive 
operations. Another fMRI experiment was conducted to investigate the neural 
precursors of abstract intentions by asking participants to perform an abstract decision 
task in which they spontaneously and freely chose to perform either of two mental 
arithmetic tasks: adding or subtracting. Given the fundamentally different neural 
processes involved in performing motor acts and arithmetic, identifying any overlap 
between the early choice-predictive signals would be of high relevance because it 
would point towards a common cerebral starting point for different types of choices. 
The task was specifically designed to encourage spontaneity of choice, but still 
requiring a conscious decision. As such, all problems and their answers involved only 
single digits, to ensure that both addition and subtraction could be performed with 
minimal effort and preparation. Essentially, these simple problems required only 
retrieval of over-learned arithmetic facts rather than actual mental calculations 
(Dehaene et al., 2003). To further ensure that participants’ choices were not affected 
by considerations of difficulty, the problems were only made available after 
participants had freely decided whether to perform addition or subtraction. 
We also aimed to address another question regarding the prediction of free 
choices. Studies 1 (Soon et al., 2008) and 2 (Bode et al., 2011) found early choice-
predictive information in areas that overlapped with the so-called default mode 
network (DMN) (Buckner et al., 2008; Fox & Raichle, 2007; Raichle et al., 2001), 
thus raising the question of whether they actually reflect similar underlying 
mechanisms. High levels of DMN activity are typically observed during off-task 
periods (Greicius et al, 2003; Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997), that is, 
during prolonged rest periods between episodes of active task performance. This 
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raises the question of whether DMN activity is also high in the period preceding the 
free decision. For these reasons, we directly investigated the link between choice-
predictive signals for both motor (Soon et al., 2008) and abstract decisions (current 
study) and these ‘off-task’ brain signals. Interestingly, we identified a partial spatial 
and temporal overlap of choice-predictive signals with activity in the DMN. 
 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Participants 
Thirty-four healthy, right-handed participants (15 men; age range, 19–31 y) 
participated in a behavioural selection test in which they performed a voluntary 
abstract intention task. Twenty-two participants (12 women; age range, 22–31 y) who 
spontaneously showed balanced choices were selected to perform the same task while 
fMRI was conducted. Of these individuals, 4 participants were subsequently excluded 
from group analyses because of excessive movement, and another was excluded for 
biased intention selection (did not select subtraction at all in one run). 
4.3.2 Behavioural paradigm 
Participants spontaneously and freely decided to perform either of two abstract 
intentions: adding or subtracting. A continuous stimulus stream was presented from 
the start of each trial period, 1 frame/s without gap. Each stimulus frame consisted of 
a consonant below a central fixation point, a single-digit number above it, and four 
single-digit answer options, one in each corner (Fig. 4-1). 
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Fig. 4-1. Measuring the onset time of free conscious abstract intentions. 
Measuring the onset and content of spontaneous abstract intentions. A trial 
began with a continuous series of stimulus frames refreshed every second, each 
consisting of a central fixation point, a consonant below it, a single-digit 
number above it, and four single-digit response options – one in each corner. 
Immediately when participants felt the spontaneous urge to perform either 
adding or subtracting, they first noted the letter on the screen (frame 0 relative 
to time of decision). The chosen arithmetic task was then performed on the 
numbers presented above the central fixation in the next two stimulus frames 
(frames 1 and 2). Next, the response options for the numbers in frames 1 and 2 
were presented in random order in the four corners of the subsequent stimulus 
frame (frame 3): the correct addition answer, the correct subtraction answer 
(absolute difference between the two numbers, i.e., no negative answers were 
involved), and two incorrect response options. Participants selected the correct 
answer for the chosen task by pressing one of four corresponding buttons, 
thereby revealing the content of their abstract decision. After the response was 
given, four letter options were presented from which participants selected the 
letter presented at frame 0, thereby revealing the time of conscious decision. 
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Participants were asked to relax as they looked passively at the letter stream. 
The order of presentation of letters was randomized under the constraint that there 
were no repetitions within a sequence of eight consonants. Immediately when they 
first became conscious of the spontaneous urge to perform either addition or 
subtraction, participants noted the letter presented on the screen (frame 0). It was 
stressed to participants that the time and choice of task were completely up to them 
but that the task should be executed without hesitation once the decision was made. 
The arithmetic task selected was then performed on the number presented above the 
central fixation from the subsequent two stimulus frames (frames 1 and 2). Since the 
problem itself appeared only after the decision was made, and participants had to 
remember the letter presented at the point of conscious decision, they could not 
choose when to perform a task by selecting particular numbers. The response options 
for the numbers in the earlier two frames were randomly presented in the four corners 
of the third stimulus frame: the correct addition answer, the correct subtraction answer 
(absolute difference between the two numbers, i.e., no negative answers were 
involved), and two inappropriate response options (Haynes et al., 2007).  
Participants selected their answer by pressing one of four corresponding 
buttons, using either their left or right index or middle fingers. Having two 
inappropriate response options ensured that participants performed the chosen 
intention properly and did not simply press a random button. As both problems and 
answers involved only single-digit numbers, both adding and subtracting operations 
were essentially over-learned and could be easily performed within the short span of 
time given without needing much effort or preparation. There was a 3 s gap between 
the point of conscious decision and the point of response during which the intention 
was conscious but entirely covert; that is, there was no motor response. This long gap 
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thus alleviated concerns that the ability to judge the time of decision accurately may 
be biased by motor preparation, execution, and resultant effects. This was a problem 
in the original Libet paradigm (Libet et al., 1983) that many subsequent studies have 
tried to address (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, 2005; Haggard et al., 2002; Lau et 
al., 2004; Lau et al., 2006; Trevena & Miller, 2002; van de Grind, 2002). After the 
first response was given, the screen went blank for 1,000 ms. Then four letter options 
were presented: the letter presented at the point of conscious decision (frame 0), the 
two letters immediately before it, and the letter immediately after it. They were shown 
for 1,000 ms in a randomized configuration in the four corners of the stimulus frame, 
from which participants selected the letter by pressing the corresponding button (Soon 
et al., 2008). On the basis of the timing of the first response, the stimulus frame during 
which the conscious decision was made could already be inferred, but having an 
explicit behavioural response provided additional confirmation and also ensured that 
the participants performed the task exactly as instructed. The screen then went blank 
again for 1,000 ms before the next trial period began with the presentation of a new 
stimulus stream. 
Before the fMRI experiment, a behavioural selection test was conducted to 
select participants who met a set of criteria and to familiarize them with the task. It 
was important that the number of instances of both abstract intentions were roughly 
balanced to avoid biased sampling. To measure how balanced participants were in 
their choices, a bias index comparing the total number of ‘addition’ trials (A) with the 
total number of ‘subtraction’ trials (S) was calculated using the formula (A − S)/(A + 
S). However, asking participants to balance their choices both would have required 
that they kept track of the distribution of intentions and would have affected their 
choice spontaneity, perhaps even encouraging preplanning of choices. Instead, 
Study 3: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Abstract Intentions 97 
 
participants were explicitly told that they did not have to balance their choices. To 
increase the chances of getting approximately balanced choices during the fMRI 
session, only participants who spontaneously showed balanced choices in the 
behavioural selection test were selected. Participants were also asked to stay as 
relaxed as possible when the stimulus stream began and to refrain from initiating 
actions too quickly just because they were eager to fulfill (perceived) experimental 
demands. Rather, they should only initiate a volitional action when they felt the 
spontaneous ‘urge’ to do so. This served two purposes: the first was to let their mental 
activity settle down to a stable state, so that any build-up of neural activity before the 
conscious decision could be clearly observed against this baseline; and the second was 
to minimize the overlapping of haemodynamic responses from different trials, so as to 
facilitate unambiguous interpretation of the BOLD signal before the conscious 
decision. Participants who were too hasty and made decisions in less than 10 s on 
average during the behavioural selection test were also excluded from the fMRI 
experiment. Participants were never told of these selection criteria throughout both 
behavioural and fMRI experiments. 
4.3.3 Functional imaging and preprocessing 
A Siemens 3T Magnetom scanner was used to acquire echo-planar image (EPI) 
volumes with 30 slices at a resolution of 3×3 mm, with a slice thickness of 2 mm with 
a 1-mm gap, covering prefrontal, parietal, and most of temporal cortex (repetition 
time, 2,000 ms; echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192×192×90). Ten runs of 152 fMRI 
volumes were acquired for each participant. A 46-slice whole-brain EPI image was 
also acquired to facilitate spatial normalization. 
fMRI data were preprocessed using SPM2 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). After 
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discarding the first two images to allow for magnetic saturation effects, the remaining 
functional images were then realigned to correct for head motion. The whole-brain 
EPI image was spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI 
template. The resultant transformation matrix was subsequently used to spatially 
normalize the decoding accuracy maps. 
4.3.4 General linear model 
A general linear model was estimated for each functional run. As this 
paradigm involved self-initiated voluntary action, we did not expect the shape of the 
BOLD time course to fit the standard stimulus-response haemodynamic profile. Thus, 
we used finite impulse response (FIR) predictors to model the BOLD signal (Henson, 
2004). A set of 14 FIR regressors were used to model each trial type (adding or 
subtracting), covering a time range from 8 s before until 18 s after the conscious 
decision (a functional scan was acquired every 2 s). In addition, trials with 
inappropriate responses for either the arithmetic problem or the decision time were 
modeled separately as error trials. Each of the two button presses were modeled 
separately as involving either the left or right hand, and were entered into the GLM as 
covariates after convolving with a standard Gaussian haemodynamic response 
function. 
4.3.5 Multivariate pattern analyses 
Decoding the content of abstract decisions 
The parameter estimates from the FIR regressors for addition and subtraction 
trials were then subjected to multi-voxel pattern analyses (MVPA) using a searchlight 
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approach to search for predictive neural activity in different brain regions in an 
unbiased fashion (Haynes et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Soon et al., 2008) 
(see Chapter 1 for details). This method has previously been shown to be highly 
sensitive in decoding simple motor intentions and in uncovering the flow of 
information in decision formation (Bode & Haynes, 2009; Soon et al., 2008). 
Independent linear support vector machine (SVM) classifications (Müller et al., 2001) 
were performed for each searchlight (3-voxel radius) and at each time-point to assess 
the amount of intention-related information present in local neural activation patterns 
using LIBSVM (www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm). In each of 10 cross-validation 
cycles, data vectors from 9 runs were used to train a SVM model to maximally 
distinguish the spatial activation patterns associated with the two decision classes: 
addition and subtraction, and the resultant model was then evaluated with the 
independent test run. Good classification accuracy implied that the local cluster of 
voxels within the searchlight spatially encoded information about the participant’s 
specific current intention at the tested time-point. Combining the accuracy maps 
across all 14 time-points (from 8 s before to 18 s after the decision) revealed the 
temporal flow of intention-related information across the cortex. 
A second-level analysis was then performed on a voxel-by-voxel basis to 
determine how well classification could be performed on average across all 
participants from each time and each position in the brain. For this purpose, individual 
classification accuracy maps were spatially normalized to the MNI EPI template. 
These spatial images of local decoding accuracy were entered into a one-way ANOVA 
with 14 levels, one for each time-point. Regions that predicted the abstract intention 
were identified using a t-contrast of time-bins before the decision onset (p<.00005 
uncorrected, 5-voxel cluster threshold). 
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Decoding the timing of abstract decisions 
As in Study 1 (Soon et al., 2008), we also assessed whether the timing of the 
decision – as opposed to the specific choice for adding or subtracting – could also be 
predicted. This distinction is referred to as when-versus-what decisions (Brass & 
Haggard, 2007; Haggard, 2008). First, multi-class pattern classification was 
performed to identify cortical areas that contained early predictive information about 
when participants would decide to perform adding or subtracting. For each searchlight, 
a multi-class SVM was trained to classify which of five time bins −8 s to 0 s before 
the decision a particular vector of parameter estimates came from. Correct 
identification of time bins before the decision indicated the possibility of predicting 
how much later it would occur. (Given the haemodynamic response delay, the BOLD 
signal at 0 s would have come from neural activity occurring a few seconds earlier.) 
This yielded five classification accuracy maps for each participant: one for each time-
point before the conscious intention. A one-way ANOVA with five levels, one per 
time-point, revealed early predictive information about the timing of the upcoming 
decision in pre-SMA (t-contrast based on all five time-points, family-wise error 
correction for multiple comparisons, and 50-voxel cluster threshold). 
This result was then used to define the region of interest for the next stage of 
the analysis, in which we tried to predict on a trial-by-trial basis when each decision 
was going to be made, using brain activity occurring before the decision became 
conscious. To maximally exploit available information relevant to decision timing, we 
combined information from spatial and temporal dimensions to perform a 
spatiotemporal classification analysis (Mourão-Miranda et al., 2007). The aim was to 
identify the spatiotemporal activation patterns immediately preceding the conscious 
decision against spatiotemporal vectors that were created from other time windows. 
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The previous analysis indicated that the three time-points immediately preceding the 
conscious decision (−4 to 0 s) were most informative about decision timing. For each 
trial, preprocessed EPI signals, rather than parameter estimates, from every three 
consecutive time-points and all of the voxels within the pre-SMA region of interest 
were concatenated into a spatiotemporal vector. If we could accurately identify the 
last (target) vector within the trial, made up of time-points −4 to 0 s, we would be able 
to predict that the participant was making an abstract decision that would result in a 
behavioural response 3 s later. All trials were randomly divided into 4 sets for each 
participant. For each of 4 cross-validation cycles, 3 sets were used to train a support 
vector classifier (radial basis function) to distinguish the target vector from vectors of 
other concatenated time-points (non-targets). To avoid biased sampling during 
training, the same number of target and non-target vectors were randomly selected. 
Every spatiotemporal vector from the remaining data set was then classified as a 
target or non-target. This allowed us to assess how accurately the exact time a 
conscious decision was going to be made could be predicted beforehand. 
4.3.6 Independent components analyses 
Finally, we investigated how the predictive signals were related to activity in 
the task-negative DMN. To identify the DMN across participants, group-level 
independent components analysis (ICA) was performed using the Group ICA of fMRI 
Toolbox (GIFT; http://mialab.mrn.org/software/gift/index.html) with the Infomax 
algorithm (Bell & Sejnowski, 1995). The DMN was visually selected from 15 
resulting components, and its time course was extracted for individual participants. 
The same analysis was also performed for our earlier experiment involving free motor 
decisions (Soon et al., 2008, Study 1). For each experiment, a conjunction analysis 
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was used to determine the spatial overlap between the DMN and choice-predictive 
regions (slightly relaxed threshold of p<.0001, 5-voxel cluster threshold). 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Behavioural results 
Only participants who were highly proficient in both tasks during the 
behavioural training session were selected for scanning. In the fMRI experiment, the 
inappropriate numbers (two out of four response options) were only selected on 1.2% 
(SE = 0.3%) of the trials, indicating that participants performed the chosen task 
correctly instead of making random responses. The participants’ decisions could thus 
be reliably inferred, based on the choice of one of the two correct answers. For the 
appropriate responses, participants randomly selected between adding (51.9% of trials, 
SE = 2.0%) and subtracting (48.1%; SE = 2.0%) with equal probability (t16<1). Given 
that the four response options were randomly arranged, the specific motor response 
was uncorrelated to the choice of task. Therefore, any information regarding the 
content of the decision that was decodable from brain activity could not possibly be a 
result of covert motor preparation. In 97.4% (SE = 0.5%) of the trials, participants 
indicated that the decision was made three frames before the response, i.e., in frame 0, 
showing that they followed the task execution sequence exactly as instructed. On 
average, participants made a spontaneous decision 17.8 s (SE = 1.8 s) after trial onset, 
resulting in 12.2 (SE = 0.8) decisions per experimental run. This long delay facilitated 
the search for unconscious neural precursors of the decision while avoiding 
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haemodynamic signal contamination from the preceding trial. 
4.4.2 Functional imaging results 
 
Fig. 4-2. Decoding the outcome of abstract decisions before and after they 
reach conscious awareness. Projected onto the medial cortical surface are 
brain regions that predicted the outcome (red) of the abstract decision before it 
was consciously made (MNI coordinates). Inset shows similar results for the 
decoding of free motor decisions before conscious awareness in Study 1 (Soon 
et al., 2008). The lateral surface shows the region that encoded the outcome of 
the decision after it became conscious. Line graphs depict for each cortical 
region the accuracy with which the abstract decision to perform addition or 
subtraction could be decoded at each time (error bars, SE; chance level, 50%). 
The vertical red line indicates the point of conscious decision, and the vertical 
gray dashed line indicates the onset of the next trial. Given the haemodynamic 
delay, information available at 0 s would have been a result of neural activity 
occurring a few seconds earlier. Please note that none of the points below 
chance level was statistically significant and should thus be attributed to 
random fluctuation. 
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Decoding the content of abstract decisions 
We first investigated which cortical regions contained predictive information 
about the outcome of the abstract decision to perform addition or subtraction, and 
whether such information was available before or after the decision reached conscious 
awareness. We found that up to 4 s before the conscious decision, a medial frontopolar 
region (p<.00005 uncorrected; 5-voxel cluster threshold; 59.5% accuracy) and a 
region straddling the precuneus and posterior cingulate (p<.00005 uncorrected; 5-
voxel cluster threshold; 59.0% accuracy) began to encode the outcome of the 
upcoming decision (Fig. 4-2). During this early phase, the overall signal in both 
regions did not show any significant change from baseline (t16<1), nor was there any 
significant difference between addition trials and subtraction trials (t16<1), suggesting 
that the information was encoded in the fine-grained spatial pattern of activation, 
rather than any global increase or decrease in neural activity (Fig. 4-3).  
We also looked for brain areas that encoded the decision after it was made, 
during the task preparation and execution phase. The task choice could be decoded 
from the angular gyrus 4 s after the time of the conscious decision (Fig. 4-2, right; 
p<.00005 uncorrected; 5-voxel cluster threshold; 64.2% accuracy). Increase in 
information began as early as 2 s post-decision and reached statistical significance at 4 
s post-decision. Taking into account the haemodynamic delay, this means that the 
angular gyrus probably began to encode the task choice around the time of conscious 
decision. This likely reflected the preparation followed by actual performance of the 
arithmetic task, as the angular gyrus has been found to be involved in the retrieval of 
overlearned arithmetic facts from memory (Dehaene et al., 2003; Grabner et al., 2009). 
As expected, there was also a global increase in BOLD signal in the angular gyrus, 
peaking around 4–6 s after the decision was made (Fig. 4-3). However, no significant 
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difference between the two arithmetic tasks was found, even when thresholds were 
relaxed (p<.001, uncorrected), indicating again that the choice of task was encoded in 
the local detailed spatial patterns of activation, rather than the global activation 
magnitude.  
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Fig. 4-3. Decoding accuracies and BOLD activation from regions that 
encoded either the content or timing of abstract decisions. (A–E) Decoding 
accuracies for the outcome of an abstract decision before and after it reached 
awareness. Each plot depicts separately for each time the peak accuracy with 
which the participant’s free decision to perform addition or subtraction could 
be decoded from the spatial pattern of brain activity in that region (black line, 
left axis; filled symbols, significant at p<.001; open symbols, not significant; 
error bars = standard error; chance level, 50%). The vertical red line shows the 
point when the decision was first consciously made. Up to 4 s before the 
decision reached conscious awareness, or ~7 s if the haemodynamic delay is 
taken into account, predictive information was already found in high-level 
brain regions (medial frontopolar cortex and precuneus/posterior cingulate). 
After the conscious decision was made, when the arithmetic task was being 
performed, the participant’s choice was encoded in the angular gyrus, which 
has been implicated in the retrieval of overlearned arithmetic facts from 
memory. The vertical gray dashed line in each graph shows the onset of the 
next trial, with new stimuli appearing. Note that in all regions of interest, 
decoding of the current intention was at chance level after the next trial began, 
suggesting there was no ‘carry-over’ of information to the next trial. (F–J) 
BOLD activity averaged across voxels in the peak searchlight for each region 
and each time (black line; filled symbols, significant at p<.001; open symbols, 
not significant; error bars = standard error). As reported previously for the free 
formation of motor intentions (Soon et al., 2008), there was gradual increase in 
overall BOLD activation in pre-SMA and SMA in the pre-decision phase, 
which did not carry information about the decision outcome. In all regions of 
interest, addition and subtraction trials had similar overall BOLD activation 
profiles (F–J: green and blue lines) and their overall differences (A–E: right 
axis, cyan line) were small, suggesting that the specific outcome of the 
intention was mainly encoded in fine-grained local patterns of activation rather 
than overall signal differences. 
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Control analysis: Decoding motor responses 
 
Fig. 4-4. Decoding the response hand for the arithmetic task. The response 
hand could only be significantly decoded from bilateral primary motor cortex 
and SMA, 6–10 s after the decision was made. Classification accuracies are 
shown for three regions of interest that encoded the abstract intention before 
the conscious decision (Top: medial frontopolar cortex), the performance of 
the chosen arithmetic task after the decision was made (Middle: angular gyrus), 
and the motor response (Bottom: right motor cortex). In each plot, the 
classification accuracy for the abstract intention is depicted in black and the 
classification accuracy for the motor response is depicted in cyan (left axis; 
filled symbols, significant at p<.001; open symbols, not significant; error bars 
= SEM; chance level, 50%). The vertical red line shows the time when the 
decision was first consciously made. Classification accuracies for the motor 
response were at chance level for medial frontopolar, angular gyrus, and all 
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other regions of interest that encoded the abstract intention (not shown). In 
contrast, the motor cortex, which did not encode the abstract intention, began 
to encode the motor response about 2 s after the angular gyrus encoded the 
chosen arithmetic operation. Together, these results suggested a temporal flow 
of abstract intention formation in high-level frontoparietal regions, followed by 
simple arithmetic task processing involving the angular gyrus and culminating 
in the motor response by the motor cortex. The vertical gray dashed line in 
each graph shows the onset of the next trial, with new stimuli appearing. 
We also used additional searchlight analyses to investigate the neural encoding 
of motor responses. As expected, the movement could be decoded from bilateral 
motor cortex and SMA, 6–10 s after the abstract decision was made (Fig. 4-4). Please 
note that this delay included the time to complete the arithmetic task plus the 
haemodynamic response delay. Importantly, these motor regions did not encode the 
abstract intention (Fig. 4-3 and 4-4). In our previous study (Soon et al., 2008), SMA 
also had choice-predictive information for motor intentions, albeit later than the 
frontopolar and parietal cortex. However, it was not possible here to decode the 
abstract intention from activity patterns in SMA at any time before or after the 
decision (Fig. 4-3). In return, the cortical regions that encoded the abstract decisions 
here did not encode the motor response at any time (Fig. 4-4), providing further 
evidence for a dissociation between the preparation of an abstract intention and motor 
processing. 
Decoding the timing of abstract decisions 
A two-stage multivariate classification analysis showed that the timing of the 
decision, rather than its outcome, could also be predicted. First, we identified brain 
regions where we could correctly identify which time bin before the decision a pattern 
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vector came from. This information was found to be encoded in the pre-SMA, 
extending into the SMA and rostral cingulate zone (p<.00005 uncorrected; 5-voxel 
cluster threshold; 31.4% accuracy; chance level, 20%; Fig. 4-5), as reported 
previously for simple motor intentions (Soon et al., 2008). In contrast, the medial 
frontopolar and posterior cingulate/precuneus regions that encoded the content of the 
decision did not contain predictive information about the timing of the decision 
(t16<1). 
 
Fig. 4-5. Classification results for timing of upcoming decisions. The 
searchlight approach was also used to determine whether different brain 
regions contained early predictive information about the timing of the 
upcoming decision rather than its outcome. (A) The bar chart shows how 
accurately the five time bins from −8 to 0 s before the upcoming decision 
could be classified (chance level, 20%) in various regions. This information 
was not available in regions that encoded the outcome of the decision but was 
found in pre-SMA stretching into SMA. (B) The pre-SMA region predictive of 
decision time projected onto the medial cortical surface is rendered in blue. (C) 
Line graph showing that pre-SMA was not predictive of the outcome of the 
upcoming decision (see Fig. 4-2 for plot legend). Thus, there was a double 
dissociation such that regions that predicted the outcome of the decision did 
not predict its timing, whereas regions that predicted the timing of the decision 
did not predict its outcome. 
Study 3: Decoding the Unconscious Formation of Abstract Intentions 110 
 
Next, we explored on a trial-by-trial basis how accurately the timing of each 
decision could be predicted before it was consciously made from the pre-SMA cluster. 
Classifiers were trained to identify spatiotemporal activity patterns in the pre-SMA 
region from −4 to 0 s (three time-points) before participants made a conscious 
decision. By detecting when this pattern occurred during each trial, we were able to 
accurately predict the exact time that participants were going to make a decision 
before they had made any behavioural response (71.8%, SE = 1.6%). 
4.4.3 DMN and intention formation 
 
Fig. 4-6. Brain images showing the default mode network. The DMN was 
identified using group-level independent components analyses in both motor 
intention (Left) and abstract intention (Right) experiments. 
The DMN was identified with standard techniques using group-level ICA 
(Calhoun et al., 2001), and its average time course was extracted (Fig. 4-6 and Fig. 4-
7). The same analysis was also applied to data from Study 1 involving free motor 
decisions for comparison (Soon et al., 2008). In both experiments, a typical fronto-
parietal DMN profile was observed (Fig. 4-6). To formally assess the spatial overlap  
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between choice-predictive regions and the DMN, we performed a conjunction 
analysis (Fig. 4-7A). In the abstract intention task, there was a partial overlap with 
DMN in anterior medial prefrontal cortex. For Study 1, there was a partial overlap 
with DMN in medial parietal cortex. Please note that it has been repeatedly shown 
that successful spatial pattern classification does not depend on whether a brain region 
shows a net positive (or negative) change in magnitude (Bode & Haynes, 2009; Bode 
et al., 2011; Haynes and Rees, 2006; Norman et al., 2006; Soon et al., 2008). 
 
Fig. 4-7. Changes in overall default mode network activity for spontaneous 
motor and abstract intentions. (A) For both motor (Left) and abstract (Right) 
tasks, the DMN (blue; p<.0001) and choice-predictive (red; p<.0001) regions 
were projected onto the medial cortical surface, with overlapping voxels ren- 
dered in green. Please note that volume rendering projected regions from dif- 
ferent depths onto the medial plane. (B) Activation time courses of the DMN 
(black line, left axis) were plotted together with the classification accuracies 
for precuneus/posterior cingulate (green dotted line, right axis) and frontopolar 
cortex (cyan dotted line, right axis). For both motor (Left) and abstract (Right) 
tasks, the default mode activity and the predictive information peaked roughly 
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around the same time before conscious decision. The DMN during this early 
preparatory phase still resembled typical off-task or ‘resting’ period activity, 
whereas parietal and prefrontal signals already encoded the upcoming choice. 
We also directly compared the time courses of DMN activity and early 
predictive information and found that both peaked roughly around the same time 
before the spontaneous decision (Fig. 4-7B). The main difference was that the default 
mode activity began to rise earlier and lasted longer. The comparable peak time of 
DMN and choice-predictive information was also interesting because it meant that 
even while parietal and prefrontal signals already had information about the outcome 
of the next choice, the DMN continued to exhibit off-task-like behavior (high BOLD 
signal). 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Our results showed that regions of medial frontopolar cortex and posterior 
cingulate/precuneus encode freely chosen abstract intentions before the decisions have 
been consciously made. Previously, a similar network of regions was reported to be 
involved in the unconscious preparation of motor intentions (Soon et al., 2008, Study 
1). In contrast, in the current experiment, the intended ‘action’ was a nonmotor, 
abstract mental operation. Importantly, the randomized response mapping ensured that 
the motor output used to indicate the arithmetic answer was independent of, and did 
not contain any information about, the abstract decision made. In addition, these 
regions did not encode the motor response at any time before or after the conscious 
decision, even when the behavioural response was made. Thus, by fully dissociating 
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high-level intentions from motor preparation and execution, our current findings 
provided direct evidence that the medial frontopolar and precuneus/posterior cingulate 
regions were involved in the formation of high-level intentions for voluntary actions 
in general. This also confirmed that the frontoparietal network previously reported 
was indeed involved in the formation of free intentions per se (Soon et al., 2008), 
rather than motor preparation. In future studies, it should be possible to enhance the 
sensitivity for smaller differences between informative brain regions by directly 
comparing motor and calculation tasks in the same participants. 
Closer to and after the point of conscious decision, other regions involved in 
the actual execution of the specific voluntary action began to encode the intention. In 
the case of a simple motor action, this was the motor system, including SMA and 
bilateral primary motor cortex (Fried et al., 2011; Soon et al., 2008). For the abstract 
mental arithmetic task reported here, this was the angular gyrus, involved in the 
retrieval of overlearned arithmetic facts from memory (Dehaene et al., 2003; Grabner 
et al., 2009). These areas were only involved in the execution of specific tasks and did 
not encode intentions in general. 
Previous studies have also shown that abstract decisions can be decoded from 
the medial frontopolar cortex, but only when these decisions were consciously 
maintained during a delay period before execution (Hampton & O’Doherty, 2007; 
Haynes et al., 2007). Thus, it has remained unclear whether the same regions were 
also involved in the unconscious formation of voluntary intentions or merely store the 
decisions after they have been consciously formed. In the current study, participants 
were not cued to make decisions at specific points in time but were allowed to make 
decisions spontaneously. By asking participants to report when they first consciously 
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decided, we could investigate what happened in the brain before the decisions were 
consciously made. We found that both medial frontopolar cortex and posterior 
cingulate / precuneus started to encode the specific outcome of the abstract decisions 
even before they entered conscious awareness. Our results suggested that, in addition 
to the representation of conscious abstract decisions (Haynes et al., 2007), the medial 
frontopolar cortex was also involved in the unconscious preparation of abstract 
decisions. 
Both regions that encoded the content of the decision ahead of time have also 
been implicated in tasks involving prospective memory (Burgess et al., 2001; Burgess 
et al., 2003; den Ouden et al., 2005; Okuda et al., 2003; Simons et al., 2006) and 
imagining the past or the future (Addis et al., 2007; Badre & D’Esposito, 2009; 
Boorman et al., 2009; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007). A possible 
interpretation of the current results is that these regions were involved in unconscious 
preparation for actions in the near future (Boorman et al., 2009). It remains unclear 
whether both conscious and unconscious representations are subserved by the exact 
same neural substrates within these regions or whether they are separable at a finer 
scale. Future studies could address this question by verifying whether mutual 
classification between unconscious and conscious decision representation is possible. 
If they do share common neural substrates, then it should be possible to use classifiers 
trained on unconscious decision representation to decode consciously maintained 
decisions and vice versa. 
At present, the specific functional roles of the frontopolar and 
precuneus/posterior cingulate regions in the formation of free decisions are not fully 
understood. Interestingly, medial frontopolar and posterior cingulate cortex have also 
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been implicated in other types of decision making involving rewards, rather than 
‘random’ and ‘free’ choices (Kahnt et al., 2010, 2011; McClure et al., 2007; Tusche et 
al., 2010; Weber & Huettel, 2008), and in tracking the subjective values of the 
rewards (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; McCoy & Platt, 2005). In most studies of decision 
making, participants are typically asked to decide between different alternatives that 
are seldom as balanced as in the current experiment. The choices are often biased by 
prior feedback (Hampton & O’Doherty, 2007) or reward characteristics such as 
reward type, reward level, or reward timing (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; McClure et al., 
2007; McCoy & Platt, 2005). 
An important finding was that regions that predicted the content of the 
decision (adding or subtracting) did not predict the exact timing of the decision. 
Rather, this information was found in the pre-SMA, which has also been shown to be 
involved in the generation of self-initiated and self-paced motor actions in 
experiments in which the timing of decisions was not explicitly measured 
(Cunnington et al., 2003; Cunnington et al., 2005; Debaere et al., 2003; Deiber et al., 
1999; Forstmann et al., 2006; Fried et al., 2011; Libet et al., 1983; Mueller et al., 2007; 
Soon et al. 2008; Wiese et al., 2004). Taken together, when decision time is 
unconstrained and self-paced, unspecific activity can build up in this region up to a 
few seconds before the decision for a voluntary action, whether motoric or abstract, is 
triggered. When different alternatives are available, the specific choice is shaped by 
activity in other regions such as the frontopolar and precuneus/posterior cingulate. 
Combining both sources of information about intention content and timing may 
provide a promising approach to more completely understanding the neural 
mechanisms underlying voluntary actions. 
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Consistent with our findings, there is increasing evidence that prior fMRI 
signals can be used to predict certain upcoming mental states: Spontaneous generation 
of motor intentions (Study 1) and abstract intentions (current study) can be predicted a 
few seconds before conscious decisions are made, and behavioural errors can be 
predicted up to 30 s before they occur (Eichele et al., 2008). Although predictive 
fMRI signals have to be interpreted carefully (Sirotin & Das, 2009), there is evidence 
suggesting that they could reflect low-frequency local field potentials (Handwerker & 
Bandettini, 2011; Logothetis et al., 2001). Moreover, other studies using electrical 
recordings have also found early predictive signals. In their original EEG study, Libet 
et al. (1983) reported the onset of the readiness potential to occur a few hundred 
milliseconds before the conscious motor intention. In a more recent study using single 
and multiunit depth electrodes, Fried et al. (2011) found that in some cases, the firing 
rates of certain medial frontal neurons could start changing up to a few seconds before 
the conscious decision is made (see figure S3e in Fried et al., 2011), lending support 
to our earlier (Soon et al., 2008) and current fMRI findings. 
It is interesting that mental calculation, the more complex task, had less 
predictive lead time than a simple binary motor choice in a previous study (Soon et al., 
2008). This could tentatively reflect a general limitation of unconscious processing in 
the sense that unconscious processes might be restricted in their ability to develop or 
stabilize complex representations such as abstract intentions. On the other hand, it 
could reflect a shorter time of intention formation, as participants also took less time 
to make spontaneous decisions (17.8 s vs 21.6 s), perhaps due to diffusion processes 
settling on a winning option more rapidly (Schurger et al., 2012). It is also worth 
noting that both studies showed the same dissociation between cortical regions that 
were predictive of the content versus the timing of the decision. This implies that the 
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formation of an intention to act depends on interactions between the choice-predictive 
and time-predictive regions. The temporal profile of this interaction, which is still 
poorly understood, is likely to determine when the earliest choice-predictive 
information is available, and might differ between tasks. 
There was a partial spatial overlap between the choice-predictive brain regions 
and the DMN, a functionally connected network of regions that typically show lower 
BOLD signal during active, externally oriented tasks (Buckner et al., 2008; Fox & 
Raichle, 2007; Greicius et al., 2003; Raichle et al., 2001). Interestingly, the state of the 
DMN during the early preparatory phase still resembled that during off-task or 
‘resting’ periods. This lends further credit to the notion that the preparatory signals 
were not a result of conscious engagement with the task (Fox et al., 2005; He & 
Raichle, 2009; Raichle et al., 2001). Furthermore, the spatial and temporal overlaps 
hint at the potential involvement of the DMN in unconscious choice preparation, 
consistent with its proposed role in self-related processing (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; 
Gusnard et al., 2001; Wicker et al., 2003). 
Conclusion 
To summarize, we directly investigated the formation of spontaneous abstract 
intentions and showed that the brain may already start preparing for a voluntary action 
up to a few seconds before the decision enters into conscious awareness. Importantly, 
these results cannot be explained by motor preparation or general attentional 
mechanisms. We found that regions in frontopolar and precuneus / posterior cingulate, 
partially overlapping with the DMN, encoded the content of the upcoming decision, 
but not the timing. In contrast, the pre-SMA predicted the timing of the decision, but 
not the content.  
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Taking together the consistent findings across our three studies, our sense of 
absolute conscious control over our voluntary actions seems to falter, even for simple 
free-choice tasks with no real consequences. 
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General Discussion 
In this thesis, we investigated the temporal order of conscious decisions and 
predictive neural activity that occur before simple, spontaneous acts of volition. In a 
series of three fMRI experiments, sensitive multi-voxel pattern analyses (MVPA) 
techniques were used to evaluate whether information about the content and timing of 
self-initiated motor or abstract actions was already available in brain activation 
patterns even before the decisions had been consciously made. Frontopolar and 
precuneus / posterior cingulate cortex were reliably found to contain predictive 
information about the content of upcoming decisions but not the timing. In contrast, 
pre-SMA and SMA encoded the timing but not the content of as yet unconscious 
decisions. Our findings are consistent with a rich body of neuroscientific evidence 
showing indisputably that we are not always consciously cognizant of the factors that 
shape our decisions (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995; 
Hsieh, Colas & Kanwisher, 2011; Lau & Passingham, 2007; Lin & Murray, 2013; 
Murawski et al., 2011; Vorberg et al., 2003), even when we subjectively feel to have 
freely and consciously made these decisions, and are fully aware of the choices made 
(Bechara et al., 1997; Colas & Hsieh, 2014; Fried et al., 2011; Haggard & Eimer, 
1999; Huang et al., 2014a, 2014b; Libet et al, 1983; Murawski et al., 2011; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). The temporal precedence of such predictive 
information relative to the conscious decision – despite participants reporting to be 
highly spontaneous, not premeditating on their decisions – suggested that at least 
some volitional actions are initiated and shaped by unconscious neural activity. The 
implications of these findings on the functional role of consciousness in human 
volition will be discussed. 
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5.1 Summary of findings 
Together, the findings reported in these three studies have uncovered neural 
networks across the brain involved in the genesis of intentions at an abstract, non-
motoric level, going beyond previous studies that investigated only the initiation of 
spontaneous motor intentions and regions restricted to motor preparation (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). Our results pointed to high-level planning stages that 
were likely involved in unconsciously preparing the decision, as previously seen in 
studies on conscious action planning (Bechara et al., 1997; Burgess et al., 2001; 
Hampton & O’Doherty, 2007; Haynes et al., 2007; Koechlin et al., 1999). In Studies 1 
and 2, we revealed the neural precursors of a two-choice spontaneous motor decision. 
The long temporal precedence of predictive information, bolstered by control 
experiments and analyses, suggested that the findings reflected the genesis of high-
level intentions rather than preparatory motor action plans. Nevertheless, critics 
continued to point to the motor nature of the decisions in our and other experiments 
utilizing the Libet clock paradigm, and questioned their relevance for abstract human 
intentions (Mele, 2009; Roskies, 2010; Schlegel et al., 2013). As such, there was a 
need to go beyond indirect inferences to study the formation of high-level abstract 
intentions directly. Thus, in Study 3 we adapted our intention clock task to an abstract 
decision which allowed us to completely dissociate abstract intention formation from 
motor preparation. Similar choice-predictive and time-predictive networks were found 
to shape both motor and abstract intentions. Interestingly, we found across the studies 
that, in the pre-decision period, there was an information double dissociation: the 
choice-predictive regions did not contain time-predictive information, while the time-
predictive regions did not encode the decision outcome. One possible interpretation is 
that different networks shape our decision of ‘what’ to do, and ‘when’ to do it. 
General Discussion 121 
 
5.1.1 Decoding decision outcome  
Even before participants consciously decided to act, choosing between two 
possible options, neural precursors of simple motor (Studies 1 and 2) and abstract 
(Study 3) intentions could be reliably detected from frontopolar (all three studies) and 
precuneus / posterior cingulate (Studies 1 and 3) cortex. Multivariate classification 
analyses could consistently decode from neural activation patterns in these regions 
whether participants were going to perform a left or right button press (Studies 1 and 
2), or to perform addition or subtraction (Study 3) with around 60% accuracy. The 
choice-predictive information emerged a few seconds before the conscious decision: 
~7 s for the motor decisions (Studies 1 and 2), and ~4 s for the abstract decisions 
(Study 3). The delay between the onset of predictive information – or more accurately, 
the underlying neural changes – and the conscious decision itself is almost definitely 
highly dependent on the decision context, constrained by one’s higher level goals. 
More importantly, given that in all three studies predictive information was available 
much earlier than previous reports of a few hundred milliseconds in EEG studies 
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983; Trevena & Miller, 2002), our findings 
could not be due to inaccuracies in the judgment or reporting of the time of conscious 
decision.  
Higher spatial and temporal resolution of imaging in Study 2 additionally 
revealed that the choice-predictive activation patterns became increasingly stable with 
closer temporal proximity to the upcoming decision. The choice-predictive regions 
(Studies 1 and 3) overlapped partially with the default mode network (DMN), and 
similarities were observed between the temporal profile of the information timecourse 
and the mean DMN BOLD signal. The predictive information disappeared from these 
regions soon after, when the voluntary action was being executed. In contrast, the 
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mean BOLD signal in these regions remained around the baseline level before the 
conscious decisions, showing no difference between the two choices. The 
mismatching temporal profiles of the information and BOLD timecourses implied that 
the information was encoded in fine-grained spatial activation patterns rather than 
regional BOLD signal changes. 
Evidence for a functional dissociation between the frontopolar cortex and the 
precuneus / posterior cingulate cluster was seen in a control experiment in Study 1 
where participants were cued when to freely select one of two hands to respond with, 
and when to execute the choice after a few seconds’ delay. The first region-of-interest 
to contain information regarding the selected hand was frontopolar cortex in the free 
selection phase, followed by the precuneus during the delay. In contrast to frontopolar 
cortex, which only encoded the chosen hand up to the delay but not during the 
execution phase, the precuneus continued to encode this information during the motor 
execution phase. This suggested that the decision was shaped and maintained by the 
frontopolar cortex, while the precuneus was involved in the maintenance and 
execution of the chosen intentional act. 
For the motor decision task, information related to the decision outcome was 
also seen at a more lenient threshold in SMA in the pre-decision phase, albeit to a 
lesser degree (Study 1). This was not seen in the abstract decision task, in which the 
resultant motor response was independent of the decision to perform addition or 
subtraction, and could not be pre-planned (Study 3). Thus, the choice-specific patterns 
in SMA were likely involved in preparing for the upcoming execution of the motor 
decision and did not represent the shaping of the high-level intention per se. 
Once the choice reached conscious awareness, various task-specific regions 
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involved in its execution began to encode the decision outcome: pre-SMA, SMA and 
bilateral primary motor cortex for a motor button press (Study 1), and angular gyrus 
for simple arithmetic (Study 3). Mean regional BOLD signal differences between 
choices were only seen in bilateral primary motor cortex post-decision in Study 1 – 
although the source neural activity could have occurred around the point of conscious 
decision. Presumably, the same neural activity also gives rise to the LRP signal 
previously reported in a similar free-choice motor task with two options (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999). Based on the finding that the LRP onset covaried with the conscious 
decision time, Haggard and Eimer (1999) suggested that the processes underlying the 
LRP may lead to our awareness of movement initiation1. Unfortunately, this could not 
be verified in our studies, as neither our intention clock nor the haemodynamic 
response provided sufficient temporal resolution to differentiate ‘late’ from ‘early’ 
decisions relative to movement onset. 
5.1.2 Decoding decision time 
Despite the limitations in temporal resolution, we were still able to extract 
information about the timing of the upcoming decision from neural activity patterns 
occurring before the conscious decision. This was found in a set of regions that was 
generally uninformative about decision outcome: pre-SMA, SMA. This time-
predictive cluster was first identified for motor decisions (Study 1), and could 
potentially be the source of the EEG and MEG readiness potential for spontaneous 
motor actions reported in previous studies (Ball et al., 1999; Deecke et al., 1982; 
 
 
                                                
1 However, in a recent study by Schlegel et al. (2013), these findings could not be 
replicated. 
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Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). Mirroring the increase in predictive 
information for decision time, there was also a trend of increasing mean BOLD signal 
in pre-SMA and SMA as the conscious decision approached. Thus, it remains unclear 
whether fine-grained spatial patterns further contributed to the classification accuracy. 
In contrast to work on the readiness potential (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 
1983), the main level of activity in motor-related brain regions began to increase as 
early as 5 s prior to the decision. One potential explanation is that decision times in 
our studies were unconstrained, so unspecific preparatory activity was possibly able to 
build up over a longer period of time. 
Interestingly, this cluster also contained early predictive information about 
when an abstract decision to act was going to occur, and showed a similar trend in 
rising mean BOLD signal (albeit not significant), even though the decision involved a 
mental action that did not require any immediate motor response (Study 3). 
Participants only needed to respond 3 s after deciding to add or subtract, having to 
first perform the chosen mental operation. By targeting the activation patterns within a 
time window of −4 to 0 s immediately preceding the decision, the exact time of the 
abstract decision could be classified with about 70% accuracy on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Taken together, our results suggested that this time-predictive cluster was involved in 
generic preparation for upcoming voluntary actions, including not just motor, but also 
abstract mental operations. On the other hand, the possibility remains that this early 
preparatory activity was indeed specific to motor outputs, but may arise whenever 
motor execution of one’s intention is anticipated, whether immediate or delayed. 
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5.2 Predicting the upcoming decision, not the previous one 
An important question is whether the early predictive information could be a 
result of the carry-over of information from the previous trial(s) rather than due to 
processes involved in the shaping of the upcoming choice (Lages & Jaworska, 2012; 
Lages et al., 2014). The basic argument is that participants were not perfectly random 
when generating a sequence of decisions, and such sequential dependency meant that 
a participant’s history of choices contained information about the upcoming decision. 
As such, the possibility exists that accurately decoding the previous choice from brain 
activity could potentially yield information about the upcoming decision. There are 
many arguments against this possibility, and we have dealt with these in detail in 
separate publications (Allefeld et al., 2014; Soon et al., 2014), in addition to the 
original publications of Studies 1 to 3 (Bode et al., 2011; Soon et al., 2008; Soon et al., 
2013). 
First, the onsets of significant classification accuracy began long after the free 
decision in the previous trial had been executed (>17 s), and increased with distance 
from the previous trial (Fig. 2-3, 2-4, 3-3, 3-6, 4-2 & 4-3), inconsistent with the idea 
that the information was decoded from remnant signals of the previous trial. Second, 
this absence of cross-trial information also held looking forward in time: the 
classification accuracies in the early predictive regions returned to chance level even 
before the next trial began, and after that it would be another 15 s or more before the 
next decision was made. If there was indeed sequential dependency and carry-over of 
information between trials, then time points that overlapped with the subsequent trial 
should also encode the choice made in the current trial. However, they did not. This 
again suggested that the predictive signals could not simply be a result of cross-trial 
correlation of choices. Third, the trials were modeled using finite impulse response 
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(FIR) predictors, which can efficiently separate temporally overlapping 
haemodynamic responses of consecutive trials as long as the intervals between trials 
are jittered (Miezin et al., 2000). As the decisions were made spontaneously at random 
self-paced intervals, there was inherent variability in the trial-to-trial intervals, which 
made the estimation of the FIR GLM even more robust against carry-over effects. If 
we were really decoding the previous decision rather than the upcoming one, it would 
mean that the information about the previous choice disappeared for a variable period 
of time, and then somehow re-emerged again a few seconds before the next decision 
was made. Fourth, each parameter estimate used for MVPA was derived from trials 
within the same run that were grouped based on the decision made at the end of each 
trial, and would have included a mix of trials with different trial histories, i.e., the 
prior trials of any parameter estimate would have included both ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
button presses in Studies 1 and 2, and both ‘addition’ and ‘subtraction’ in Study 3. 
This would have minimized – if not eliminated – any effect of trial-specific history. 
Fifth, the current choice could be predicted behaviorally from the preceding choice 
with about 62-64% accuracy, comparable to other studies (Lages & Jaworska, 2012; 
Lopes, 1982). If this was the singular source of the brain-based prediction accuracies 
of ~60%, i.e., our classification analyses were simply decoding the remnant signals 
from the preceding trial, it would imply that we could decode the previous trial with 
near perfect accuracy (Soon et al., 2014). This was highly improbable, given that in 
Study 1, even though primary motor cortices showed clear post-decision differences 
in mean activation magnitude between left and right button presses, decoding 
accuracy remained below 80% (Fig. 2-3). Finally, we directly evaluated whether brain 
activation patterns in the predictive frontal and parietal regions actually contained 
information about the previous trial (Fig. 5-1; Soon et al., 2014). An independent 
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MVPA, similar to the original analyses except that the trials were grouped based on 
the decision in the previous trial rather than the current trial, showed that activation 
patterns did not encode the previous decision. 
 
Fig. 5-1. Predictive brain signals do not encode decision in previous trial. 
For this reanalysis of the original data (left: Soon et al., 2008; right: Soon et al., 
2013) we shifted the trial labels by one trial, i.e., trials were grouped based on 
the decision made in the previous trial, rather than the current one. 
Classification accuracies for the shifted models were not significant at any ROI, 
implying that spillover from the previous trial did not provide a better account 
of the predictive brain signals reported in Studies 1 and 3 (red: label-shifted 
reanalysis; black: original analysis). Here, data was collapsed across ROIs 
which individually contained choice-predictive signals in the original analyses 
to increase the statistical power for additionally testing for a difference 
between the original and the shifted analyses (*p<.05). This was necessary as 
the original analysis was tested against a fixed (i.e., ‘noise-free’) parameter 
(theoretical chance-level), whereas the statistical power for testing for a 
difference between the original and shifted analyses is affected by the noise in 
the shifted classification. Please also note that the baseline accuracies apparent 
here (and in the original studies) show that the default accuracy is 50%, as 
expected for two alternative choices. For this reason, we did not perform 
additional permutation tests. 
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However, please note that the above arguments in no way amount to the 
postulation that the current decision is completely unaffected by the preceding history 
of choices, which would imply a break in the causal flow of events in the brain. 
Clearly, a temporally continuous evolution of dynamic brain states must link the 
sequence of choices. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the choice-
predictive signals we detected across all three studies were direct and explicit 
representations of the previous trial. Our arguments and analyses directly refute such 
an interpretation, and support the view that the predictive information reflected neural 
preparation for the upcoming decision. 
 
5.3 Networks of intention 
Having addressed some potential concerns about our paradigms, we now turn 
to the theoretical implications of our findings. Integrating the results across our three 
studies and other publications, a rudimentary picture of intention generation emerges 
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haynes et al., 2007; Libet et al., 1983; Trevena & Miller, 
2002). We have shown that spontaneous decisions for simple voluntary acts may be 
shaped by preceding neural activity across two groups of regions: frontopolar cortex 
(BA10) and precuneus / posterior cingulate cortex (what to do); and pre-SMA and 
SMA (when to act). Next we shall consider the specific functional role of each of 
these regions in preparing the upcoming voluntary action, and how they interact to 
bring about the final decision to act. 
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5.3.1 Frontopolar cortex 
For both motor and abstract decisions, choice-predictive information first 
arose in the frontopolar cortex and the posterior cingulate / precuneus. The frontopolar 
cortex (BA 10) has previously been shown to be involved in free selection (Haynes et 
al., 2007), self-reflection about intentions (Burgess et al., 2001; Gusnard et al., 2001), 
and elaboration of past and future events (Addis, et al., 2007; Burgess et al., 2001; 
Sakai & Passingham, 2003; Schacter et al., 2007). In addition, it has often been 
implicated in tasks requiring high-level executive control, especially those that 
involve storing conscious intentions across a delay (Burgess et al., 2001; Haynes et al., 
2007; Koechlin et al., 1999; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007; Ramnani & Owen, 2004; Sakai 
& Passingham, 2003). Activity in this region can build up even prior to the execution 
of simple movements (Groll-Knapp et al., 1977), as in Studies 1 and 2. However, its 
relevance for unconscious preparation of intentions has not been demonstrated 
previously until now.  
Of particular interest is the involvement of frontopolar cortex in prospective 
memory (Burgess et al., 2001; Burgess et al., 2003; den Ouden et al., 2005; Gilbert, 
2011; McFarland and Glisky, 2009; Mommenejad & Haynes, 2012, 2013; Okuda et 
al., 2003; Sakai, 2008; Simons et al., 2006), which requires the retention of an 
intention over a delay until the appropriate moment for execution. Depending on 
whether the delayed intention requires proximal or distal execution, they may not 
always be maintained in conscious awareness, but can get triggered by external cues 
or spontaneous retrieval (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; Mommenejad & Haynes, 2012, 
2013). In fact, it may be important to keep some delayed intentions out of working 
memory so that cognitive resources can be freed up for some other task that is of 
higher priority or requires immediate attention (Burgess et al., 2007; Einstein et al., 
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2005; Mommenejad & Haynes, 2012, 2013). Prioritizing amongst multiple goals is 
required for appropriate actions to be executed at the right time. For example, 
remembering at this moment that I have yet to complete the peer review for a journal 
manuscript due in two days is not helpful to my current intention: finishing up my 
thesis. That being said, spontaneous early retrieval or rehearsal could facilitate long-
term retention of distal intentions, thereby supporting prospective memory (Einstein et 
al., 2005). It would not be inappropriate to see prospective memory as part of the 
executive system for the generic management of high-level current and latent goals 
and intentions, which includes selecting among different latent intentions for current 
execution or conscious deliberation (Burgess et al., 2000; Burgess et al., 2007). At any 
point in time, many latent intentions in our mental to-do list remain outside of 
conscious awareness. How these latent intentions are represented neurally, and how 
their neural representations compete to emerge in conscious awareness is still poorly 
understood. The intention clock paradigm may have allowed us to catch glimpses of 
this unconscious competition. One possibility is that the activation of frontopolar (BA 
10) cortex in prospective memory tasks actually reflects its high-level executive role 
in the generic management of goals and intentions (Koechlin et al., 1999; Koechlin & 
Hyafil, 2007; Mommenejad & Haynes, 2012, 2013; Ramnani & Owen, 2004). 
Perhaps the two options in each decision scenario in each of our studies were 
represented as separate latent intentions. During the experiment, they would be the 
two most active and mutually exclusive candidates competing for proximal execution, 
possibly as described by multi-alternative drift-diffusion accumulator models (Bode et 
al., 2014; Bogacz, 2007; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). The 
winner emerges into conscious awareness and is executed, i.e., a voluntary decision is 
made to act. 
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Previous studies suggest a functional dissociation in prospective processing 
between lateral and medial aspects of frontopolar cortex, based on their respective 
positive and negative mean BOLD activation profiles (Burgess et al., 2001; Simons et 
al., 2006). However, this could be because medial frontopolar cortex (also referred to 
as anterior medial prefrontal cortex) is an important hub of the DMN, which usually 
shows lower BOLD signal during most active tasks compared to resting baseline 
(Greicius et al, 2003; Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). In contrast, our 
multivariate analyses were indifferent to the mean activation level of a cortical region, 
and instead focused on the information content encoded in spatial activation patterns. 
Here we found predictive information for both motor (Study 1) and abstract (Study 3) 
intentions in medial frontopolar cortex, and for motor intentions in lateral frontopolar 
cortex (Studies 1 and 2). Our experimental paradigms did not reveal a consistent 
functional dissociation between medial and lateral BA 10 in information content 
related to preparing simple upcoming decisions. However, decision-making studies 
consistently show that an adjacent region of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex 
represents subjective or economic value (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Kahnt et al., 2010, 
2011; Montague & Berns, 2002; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006). Perhaps similar 
subjective ‘valuations’ of latent intentions were also used to guide the non-economic 
free decisions in our studies. Expanding the information search to a wider variety of 
decision contexts may help elicit their functional specificity (Mommenejad & Haynes, 
2012, 2013). 
It is intriguing that similar cortical regions were involved in the preparation of 
both motor and abstract decisions. However, it remains unclear whether these 
different decisions actually involved the same neural populations within the same 
individual. One possibility is that different types of decisions were coded by 
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independent neural populations coexisting within the same cortical region. 
Alternatively, the same neural networks may subserve different types of decisions, 
perhaps with the same sets of competing neural coalitions being flexibly assigned to 
opposing options across different decision contexts. If true, then it might be possible 
to predict abstract decisions based on a classification model trained using motor 
decision activation patterns, and vice versa. 
Another important issue relates to the neural origin of the information 
contained in the predictive spatial patterns. One possible explanation could be that 
there is a fine-grained clustering of cells with similar preferences for one of the two 
decision outcomes and that this clustering is smaller than the size of conventional 
functional areas. In the visual cortex, information encoded in similar fine-grained 
patterns of visual cortex can be read out using pattern recognition techniques. 
Simulations based on realistic neural topographies (Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani 
& Tong, 2005) suggest that this may be due to a ‘biased sampling’ or ‘aliasing’ of 
fine-grained feature columns by the individual fMRI voxels (Haynes & Rees, 2006). 
This raises the question whether the informative spatial patterns we found might point 
to the existence of a similar columnar architecture in prefrontal cortex, where cells 
might be clustered according to similar roles in selective cognitive control. Such a 
columnar architecture has been highly debated as a general principle of cortical 
organization (Horton & Adams, 2005; Mountcastle, 1997). It remains unclear whether 
there is such a topographic organization in prefrontal cortex and other association 
areas (Averbeck et al., 2006; Constantinidis et al., 2001). Alternatively, our 
classification patterns might reflect the sampling of a distributed population code for 
different tasks, as has been proposed from the findings of similar studies on object 
recognition (Haxby et al., 2001). 
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5.3.3 Precuneus / Posterior cingulate 
It has long been known that parietal cortex plays an important role in 
processing of motor intentions (Quian-Quiroga et al., 2006; Sirigu et al., 2004). The 
more inferior medial regions found in our studies, stretching from precuneus to 
posterior cingulate cortex, have been involved in several tasks closely related to 
intentions, including prospective processing (Burgess et al., 2001; Mommenejad & 
Haynes, 2012, 2013), self-referential processing (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Kircher 
et al., 2000; Kjaer et al., 2002; Lou et al., 2004; Vogt & Laureys, 2005), and even as 
here in free-choice tasks (Larsson et al., 1996). Like the medial frontopolar cortex, the 
precuneus / posterior cingulate cortex is also a central hub in the DMN (Buckner et al., 
2008; Fox & Raichle, 2007; Raichle et al., 2001), and is thought to be heavily 
involved in monitoring internal and external changes, facilitating novel behaviour or 
thought in response, or even to regulate the focusing of attention internally or 
externally (Leech & Sharp, 2013; Pearson et al., 2011). While this region is thought to 
be a potential neural correlate of consciousness (Vogt & Laureys, 2005), our findings 
suggest that it also encodes mental representations regarding future decisions that may 
not be directly or immediately available to conscious awareness. 
In Study 1’s control experiment, the precuneus / posterior cingulate only began 
to encode a motor decision after it was available in frontopolar cortex, and stored this 
information across a delay until the execution phase. This suggested that whereas 
frontopolar cortex might be involved in task selection, the precuneus’ role could be to 
store the decision across a delay – perhaps also detailing the actions required for task 
fulfilment (Haggard, 2008) – until the decision reached awareness and eventual 
execution. We speculate that this region may be instrumental in binding one’s 
intentions with the actual outcome, perhaps encoding the forward model of the 
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expected action and outcome, an important mechanism for ensuring that one’s actions 
lead to intended results, and for establishing a sense of ‘willing’ and of agency over 
one’s actions (Aarts et al., 2004; Haggard, 2008; Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Sirigu et al., 
2004; Wegner, 2003). Our theory is also consistent with its involvement in 
visuospatial coordination, directing of spatial attention when imagining, preparing or 
making movements (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Kawashima et al., 1995; Wenderoth 
et al., 2005). Also required would be the monitoring of both internal and external 
states for changes, and controlling of internal or external focus of attention, in 
agreement with the stipulated functional roles ascribed to the DMN (Buckner et al., 
2008; Fox & Raichle, 2007; Raichle et al., 2001). The centrality of the precuneus / 
posterior cingulate cluster in the cortical network as a well-connected small-world 
network hub between parietal and prefrontal regions would be well suited for serving 
these functions (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009). The finding that this region also encoded 
the outcome of abstract decisions – before a motor response could be specified – 
would imply that its proposed role in binding intention to output is not restricted to 
the motor domain, but also includes the fulfilment of higher level action goals. 
Whether the precuneus / posterior cingulate merely stores the intended action 
and coordinates its execution, or actively shapes the intention itself is less clear. One 
possibility is that this region may also evaluate and provide feedback on the viability 
of proximal intentions based on the current state of the body and the external 
environment (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Kawashima et al., 
1995; Wenderoth et al., 2005). Supporting evidence is seen in its encoding of 
participants’ decisions when they are forced to ‘identify’ objects in a noisy scene 
without any object, suggesting that the precuneus shapes the guesses, perhaps by 
amplifying perceptual noise, or by generating random choices (Bode et al., 2012). 
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5.3.2 Pre-SMA / SMA 
Previous studies on spontaneous free decisions have usually targeted simple 
motor decisions and cortical regions involved in motor execution, which were also 
assumed to play a key role in determining the decision (Deecke et al., 1982; Haggard 
& Eimer, 1999; Lau et al., 2004; Libet et al., 1983; Trevena & Miller, 2002). Our 
findings that activity patterns and mean BOLD signal changes in pre-SMA and SMA 
were predictive of the timing of the upcoming decision / spontaneous act corroborated 
their findings that the onset of the Bereitschaftspotential can come before the 
conscious decision (Deecke et al., 1982; Fried et al., 2011; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; 
Libet et al., 1983; Trevena & Miller, 2002). In addition, we showed that these signals 
can actually arise a few seconds before the conscious decision, much earlier than the 
few hundred milliseconds previously reported. Various reasons facilitated our 
detection of such early signals. Crucially, our participants did not have to concern 
themselves with blinking, which had to be avoided in EEG studies due to the large 
signal artefacts (Libet et al., 1983). As such, their spontaneity was not temporally 
constrained, and was therefore more ‘free’. This likely allowed participants to settle 
into a more ‘relaxed’ state, as seen in the longer delay between trial onset and decision 
time, ~20 s in our studies compared to typical delays of around 5 s in previous studies 
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Lau et al., 2004). Also, how early the RP onset can be 
detected in electrophysiological signals is dependent on the baseline period selected 
for comparison. Haggard & Eimer (1999) did not find any clear baseline up to 2600 
ms pre-movement, the maximum range they could interrogate due to technical reasons, 
and thus could not reject the possibility that the RP onset might have occurred earlier. 
This was recently corroborated in a depth recording study using Libet’s intention 
clock paradigm (Fried et al., 2011). Fried et al. reported that in trials which patients 
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took longer to make simple motor decisions, thereby allowing for the use of an earlier 
reference baseline, neural changes in medial frontal regions could be detected up to 
several seconds before the conscious decision was made. 
While information about the decision outcome was also detected in SMA, as 
implicated previously in free-selection tasks (Cunnington et al, 2005; Deiber et al., 
1991; Forstmann et al., 2006; Frith et al., 1991; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Larsson et 
al., 1996; Lau et al., 2004; Libet et al., 1983; Pedersen et al., 1998; Tanji, 2001), the 
onset of this information was much later than in higher-level control regions. Thus, 
SMA was unlikely to be the cortical site where the specific decision for a movement 
originated (Eccles, 1982), but more likely to be involved in generic motor preparation 
in the early phase, and subsequently during motor execution. Please note that due to 
the temporal delay of the haemodynamic response, the small lead times in SMA / pre-
SMA of up to several hundred milliseconds reported in previous studies (Haggard & 
Eimer, 1999; Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; Libet et al., 1983) are below the temporal 
resolution of our method. Hence, we cannot exclude that other regions contain 
predictive information in the short period immediately preceding the conscious 
intention. It would be difficult to ascertain whether such signals occurred before or 
after the decision in fMRI signals. 
An intriguing question that remains unanswered is how the choice-predictive 
regions and the time-predictive regions interact to shape the ‘what’ and ‘when’ of a 
spontaneous voluntary act (Haggard & Brass, 2008; Mommenejad & Haynes, 2012). 
In the pre-decision phase, there was an information double-dissociation between these 
two sets of regions. Even though information about decision time could be gleaned 
from the pre-SMA / SMA cluster, it remained unclear whether it was actually involved 
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in deciding when to act, or only in preparing for execution of the decision formed in 
choice-predictive regions. One possibility is that once a winning option began to 
emerge in choice-predictive regions, this triggered neural preparations for action 
execution in pre-SMA / SMA. Alternatively, perhaps when activity within this time-
predictive cluster crossed a certain threshold, e.g., via diffusion processes (Schurger et 
al., 2012), an ‘urge’ to act was triggered (Libet et al., 1983), and the ‘preferred’ option 
in choice-predictive regions at that moment was selected for execution, resulting in a 
specific voluntary action. This could explain why choice-predictive regions were not 
predictive of decision time. On the other hand, choice-predictive patterns were found 
to become increasingly stable over time with higher spatial and temporal imaging 
resolution (Study 2). In addition, given that both choice-predictive and time-predictive 
information appeared to build up in tandem over a relatively long duration, it would 
seem more likely that there was ongoing communication between both sets of regions, 
such that both ‘when’ and ‘what’ to do reached a conscious decision concurrently in 
our experimental contexts to culminate in a spontaneous voluntary action. When 
asked to report the decision times for ‘what’ to do, and ‘when’ to do separately, no 
significant difference was found. However, it should be pointed out that participants 
were specifically instructed to be spontaneous, not to pre-decide on a particular choice, 
and to execute their decision once it was made. This could have inadvertently 
contributed to the temporal coincidence of ‘what’ and ‘when’ decisions, and perhaps 
reduced further evaluations of ‘whether’ to execute a chosen action (Brass & Haggard, 
2007; Haggard, 2008). 
Detailing the functional and information connectivity between choice-
predictive and time-predictive networks in various decision contexts using higher 
resolution imaging could help elucidate how they interact to shape a voluntary action. 
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5.4 Functional role of consciousness in volitional acts 
Our empirical results consistently support the idea that free decisions for 
spontaneous voluntary acts, both motoric and abstract, result from a cascade of 
activity within different brain networks, which may occur before the point of 
conscious decision. It appears unlikely that participants consistently misreported their 
subjective decision time by a delay of a few seconds. While further evidence is 
needed before a causal relationship can be concluded, the availability of choice-
predictive neural information before the subjective decision time suggest that prior 
neural activity may have affected the conscious decision. In other words, one may be 
conscious of making a choice without conscious knowledge of how or why the 
decision was actually made (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997). If unconscious neural activity 
indeed plays a significant role in shaping my decisions before they enter into 
conscious awareness, and I am not cognizant of such influences as I consciously 
‘decide’, can I still claim that the resultant ‘voluntary actions were caused by my 
conscious mind? Or did I simply become aware of unconsciously formed intentions 
without really knowing how they really came about, akin to how I perceive sensory 
inputs (Haggard, 2008; Wegner, 2003)? If so, what is the specific functional role of 
my consciousness in my intentions and actions? 
Before we further explore the significance of our results for causal role of 
consciousness, it should be noted that doubts have been raised about the relevance of 
studies utilizing variants of Libet’s intention clock paradigm, including ours, for 
understanding human intentions (Mele, 2009; Roskies, 2010; van de Grind, 2002). 
The general intention to press a button (or in the case of Study 3, to perform addition 
or subtraction) at some point in the experiment was arguably formed during the 
briefing at the beginning of the experiment. The subsequent ‘choices’ made in each 
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trial were just the perpetuation of this high-level distal intention. Moreover, the 
participants were not completely free in each decision, given that only two options 
were provided, completely specified by the experimenter. Also, the participants were 
asked to monitor and execute any spontaneous urges, which leads to the question of 
whether these spontaneous ‘decisions’ should be considered bona fide intentions at all. 
Crucially, the participants were fully conscious when they voluntarily agreed to 
perform the task according to instructions, way before any of the reported 
‘unconscious’ decision neural precursors occurred. Thus, according to this view, these 
studies pose no threat to the concept of mental causation or free will as they only 
revealed the neural precursors of the urges and not the intention itself. 
Indeed, any volitional act can and should be seen within the wider context of 
the underlying hierarchy of goals and intentions (Haggard, 2008). Nevertheless, there 
is little doubt that the resultant action in every trial of our experiments would itself be 
considered a voluntary act performed according to one’s volition. Neither the button 
presses in Studies 1 and 2, nor the mental arithmetic operations in Study 3 would be 
considered automatized behaviour that are thought to bypass the conscious mind 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). The causal roots of each action, including ‘what’, ‘when’ 
and ‘whether’ aspects of the decision (Brass & Haggard, 2008), should presumably be 
traced back to the conscious mind at the point when one consciously decides to act. 
Even though the intentional tasks used in our studies indeed involved highly 
constrained decision-making, what remains clear is that: 1) the participant’s decision 
to choose one of the two options in any particular trial was neither completely 
determined by the experimenter nor by the distal intention at the beginning of the 
experiment (Haggard, 2008); and 2) the frequency or exact time to make a voluntary 
action was up to the individual participant (and in our fMRI studies, not even 
General Discussion 140 
 
constrained by eyeblinks). As such, there were still degrees of freedom to each 
decision in both the exact timing and specific choice of actions, and it would be 
legitimate to ask whether they were in fact fully determined by the conscious mind. 
The fact that our prediction accuracy was only around 60% implied that there 
was still room for the conscious mind to potentially exert a causal influence. Prima 
facie, this level of prediction accuracy would indeed suggest that the neural origins of 
the informative signals contributed to shaping the decisions, but did not determine 
them completely. However, it should be noted that even though the searchlight MVPA 
analyses can be highly sensitive, there are still technical limitations. For instance, in 
Study 1, even in the primary motor cortex, where mean regional BOLD signal 
differences between the left and right button presses could be easily detected in 
univariate contrasts during the actual execution, the decoding accuracy remained 
below 80%. Furthermore, the general goal of our experiments was to demonstrate the 
existence of significant unconscious predictive information, rather than to push the 
limits of prediction accuracy. As such, we adopted a relatively conservative approach 
to classification, and did not, for example, use non-linear classifiers, or optimize 
classification parameters to increase prediction accuracy. Even so, the choices of some 
individuals could be predicted with accuracies as high as 80%. It remains to be seen 
how much more predictive information can be extracted from the pre-decision neural 
activity patterns with further improvements in data acquisition technology and image 
analyses techniques. 
That being said, our findings cannot and should not be taken as categorically 
precluding the possibility of mental causation, since our experiments did not – and 
were not designed to – show that the conscious mind is never the direct cause of 
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volitional acts (Roskies, 2010; Tse, 2013). However, the very existence of these 
above-chance predictive signals, which the decision-maker does not have conscious 
access to, already begs explanation, if one believes that the conscious mind is the sole 
cause of all voluntary actions. 
A conscious decision to act (or not to act) is simply a decision made while one 
is in a conscious state, and does not entail that the decision process is necessarily 
conscious, only that the decision outcome is (Rosenthal, 2008). For example, 
information contained in subliminal stimuli can affect our conscious decisions despite 
the lack of conscious representation (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Greenwald, Klinger, 
& Schuh, 1995; Hsieh, Colas & Kanwisher, 2011; Lau & Passingham, 2007; Lin & 
Murray, 2013; Marcel, 1983a, 1983b; Murawski et al., 2012; Vorberg et al., 2003). 
Similarly, we may even be unaware of how supraliminal stimuli affect our conscious 
decisions (Bechara et al., 1997). This brings to question the specific causal role of 
consciousness in the flow of processes from the genesis of an intention to its physical 
(or mental) execution. On the one hand, our subjective experiences would lead us to 
believe that our conscious minds are the sole authors of our decisions. On the other 
extreme, consciousness has been proposed to be a passive witness with no causal role, 
a view central to some Hindu views of consciousness (Gupta, 1998). More recently, 
Rosenthal (2008) argued that though the cognitive states that consciousness is 
associated with have functional significance, their being conscious does not. Others 
have proposed a more limited causal role for consciousness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Libet et al., 1983). Libet et al. (1983) suggested that 
consciousness could still exert causal influence via a ‘power of veto’, a notion that has 
earned the moniker of free won’t (Brass and Haggard, 2007). Even while unconscious 
neural activity shape upcoming decisions, consciousness acts as a gatekeeper that can 
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decide whether to execute the resultant choice or to abort it. Such intentional 
inhibition has been shown to involve dorsal fronto-median cortex and bilateral 
anterior insula (Brass & Haggard, 2007). However, the initiation of inhibition may 
also find its roots in unconscious neural activity (Filevich et al., 2013). 
More generally, consciousness is thought to be important for achieving a 
balance between attentional focus and cognitive flexibility, so as to promote 
performance and adaptive behaviour, especially when there are obstacles in the 
pursuit of one’s goals (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). 
Consciousness may serve as a platform for integrating diverse brain functions that 
could otherwise operate independently, promoting information exchange for the 
exercise of global coordination and control, according to the Global Workspace 
Theory (Baars, 1997; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). While not every volitional act thus 
mediated would require or benefit from this purported role of consciousness, having 
this functionality as a central component of the sophisticated system underlying 
volitional actions can potentially expand our repertoire of possible actions and 
increase our adaptability in general (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). Based on this 
perspective, different sources of predictive information detected in our studies may 
reflect the independent operation of various decision-related functions, which 
remained outside conscious awareness until the point of entry into the ‘global 
workspace’. Rather than being the direct unitary cause of our actions, consciousness 
may act as a generic enabling platform where ‘decisions’ (or ‘proposals’) could 
potentially be further evaluated before, during and after execution. As our tasks 
involved simple free decisions of no real consequence, and participants were 
encouraged to be spontaneous, the final decision very likely played out according to 
preceding preparatory activity, with little conscious intervention (Bode et al., 2014). 
General Discussion 143 
 
The extent to which prior neural activity shape our conscious decisions is 
likely to be dependent on the decision context. Perhaps decisions of greater personal 
consequence would involve more conscious deliberation, and therefore be less 
predictable from unconscious neural activity. However, it has been shown that even 
goal selection (Custers & Aarts, 2005), the strength of motivation (Pessiglione et al., 
2007) and cognitive resource recruitment (Bijleveld et al., 2009) can be modulated by 
subliminal reward primes. More recently, endogenous brain activity patterns occurring 
before participants were exposed to gamble options could predict whether they would 
be more prone to choosing the risky option or not (Huang et al., 2014). Compared to 
unconscious thought processes, whether conscious deliberation really leads to better 
decisions when making complex choices is also a matter of much debate (Dijksterhuis 
et al., 2006; Rey et al., 2009). In the same vein, while it remains to be shown that our 
findings based on simple free decisions of no personal consequence can be 
generalized to consequential decisions that typically engage more conscious 
deliberation, the possibility remains that such conscious deliberation may be shaped 
by prior unconscious neural activity or brain states. Thus, the specific causal influence 
of consciousness in decision making and its purported benefits remains an open 
question. 
 
5.6 Conclusion and outlook 
As volitional agents who are not just concerned with daily survival or reacting 
to environmental changes reflexively, human beings have to constantly balance 
complex hierarchies of goals and intentions. This requires prioritizing amongst 
multiple possible intentions so that appropriate actions can be executed at the right 
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time, while other goals are kept out of working memory, and conscious awareness, 
while being maintained unconsciously. From this perspective, finding unconscious 
neural precursors of voluntary decisions should come as no surprise. After all, on what 
basis do we presuppose that there is a unitary cause – the conscious mind – for the 
diverse repertoire of human voluntary actions that can be found within the most 
complicated connected dynamic structure in human knowledge – the human brain?  
A better approach might be to define the functional parameters for an action to 
be considered fully volitional. While a conscious brain state would be a necessary 
qualifying parameter, it would not be the singular cause, but an essential part of the 
sophisticated neural machinery underlying human volition. Here, we have presented 
empirical evidence showing that, at the very least, our intuitions that our decisions are 
always and purely products of the conscious mind may not be reliable. Rather, various 
aspects of our decisions are shaped by neural activity to which we do not have direct 
conscious assess, for both motor and abstract decisions. Much still needs to be done to 
elucidate the complex structure of neural networks involved in intention formation, 
and the information dynamics that lead to the formation of a decision. Further studies 
capitalizing on improvements in brain imaging technologies and multivariate pattern 
analyses are needed to pinpoint the functional specialization of each region and the 
effective connectivity between them. 
While we have uncovered evidence for the unconscious neural initiation of 
free decisions in the brain, how and why this translates into a conscious decision in 
the mind remains elusive. On the other hand, embedded in the information patterns 
that distinguish conscious decisions and their precursors might be a unique chance of 
identifying the neural correlates of consciousness.  
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